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ARTICLE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AS POLITICAL QUESTION
Zachary S. Price*
ABSTRACT
Across a range of contexts, federal courts have crafted doctrines that limit judicial secondguessing of executive nonenforcement decisions. Key case law, however, carries important ambiguities of scope and rationale. In particular, key decisions have combined rationales rooted in
executive prerogative with concerns about nonenforcement’s “unsuitability” for judicial resolution. With one nonenforcement initiative now before the Supreme Court and other related issues
percolating in lower courts, this Article makes the case for the latter rationale. Judicial review of
nonenforcement, on this account, involves a form of political question, in the sense of the “political question doctrine”: while executive officials hold a basic statutory and constitutional obligation to faithfully execute regulatory statutes, that obligation is subject to incomplete judicial
enforcement because structural constitutional considerations place a gap between executive duties
and judicial enforcement of those duties. What is more, the twin prongs of the modern political
question doctrine—“textual assignment” and “judicial manageability”—usefully describe the
gap between executive obligation and judicial power. Bringing enforcement suits and prosecutions in particular cases is a textually assigned function of the executive branch, while the
broader executive task of setting priorities for enforcement frequently presents a judicially unmanageable inquiry.
This reframing may account descriptively for much of the current doctrine but also carries
important normative implications. Among other things, the framework clarifies that judicial
decisions may not fully define executive obligations with respect to enforcement; it helps identify
contexts in which judicial review may be appropriate, including with respect to current immigration programs before the Supreme Court and the controversial prosecutorial practice of entering
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“deferred prosecution agreements” in white-collar criminal cases; and it reinforces longstanding
arguments for a more flexible doctrine of Article III standing.

INTRODUCTION
What authority do federal courts have to review executive nonenforcement choices? On the one hand, the Supreme Court has deemed
prosecutorial discretion an “exclusive” and “absolute” executive authority,1
interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to presumptively bar
judicial review of nonenforcement,2 and severely limited Article III standing
to challenge government inaction.3 On the other hand, the Court has indicated that agencies cannot “simply . . . disregard statutory responsibilities,”4
suggested that they cannot adopt policies that “abdicat[e]” enforcement,5
and at least entertained the possibility of tort damages for failures of enforcement.6 What is more, the Court has repeatedly coupled assertions of executive authority with descriptions of enforcement discretion as “unsuitable” for
judicial review,7 leaving it unclear whether executive nonenforcement
authority is unreviewable because it is absolute, or only absolute insofar as it
is unreviewable. While generally insulating executive nonenforcement from
judicial scrutiny, the case law thus carries important ambiguities of scope and
rationale.
Clarifying the boundaries of judicial power over executive enforcement
has nevertheless gained new urgency. Depending on how various preliminary questions are resolved, the Supreme Court may well address the issue
this term in litigation challenging controversial immigration nonenforcement initiatives.8 At the same time, litigation percolating in lower courts has
raised questions about prosecutorial “deferred prosecution agreements”
(DPAs), an increasingly significant executive practice in which the government forgoes prosecution in exchange for the defendant’s acceptance of
1 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 454 (1868); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965)); see also, e.g.,
ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (stating that “the refusal to
prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review”).
2 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985).
3 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992); cf. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (“The doctrine of standing . . . ‘serves to prevent the
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.’” (quoting
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013))).
4 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993).
5 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
6 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761, 765 (2005) (indicating
that a state could “create a system by which police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better policing might have prevented”).
7 See infra Section I.A.
8 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906
(2016). Justice Scalia’s passing as this Article was going to press has also created the possibility that the Supreme Court will affirm the lower court’s decision by an equally divided
vote.
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alternative reform conditions.9 In both contexts, critics have pushed for a
broader judicial role, despite courts’ historic reluctance to intrude on executive enforcement decisions, yet few commentators have grappled adequately
with the particular challenges that judicial review of enforcement-related
questions presents.
This Article proposes a framework for nonenforcement’s reviewability—
one rooted in considerations of “suitability” for review rather than notions of
preclusive executive prerogative. In prior work, I have addressed the scope
of executive nonenforcement authority in its own right and directly questioned the origins and validity of a supposed preclusive nonenforcement prerogative.10 Here, I build on this account by exploring reasons why executive
enforcement obligations may nonetheless defy complete judicial elaboration.
In particular, although courts have often invoked notions of Article II prerogative to justify their passivity with respect to nonenforcement,11 I argue that
institutional limitations on courts—limitations with a broader resonance in
constitutional and administrative law doctrines—provide a cogent descriptive
and normative justification for judicial deference to executive
nonenforcement.
The Constitution by its terms obligates the President to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”12 Yet courts confront very real practical and
institutional challenges in ensuring faithful execution of prohibitory statutes
by enforcement officials. To begin with, directly compelling an enforcement
suit in any particular case would raise acute separation-of-powers concerns, as
it would collapse the constitutional separation of judicial and executive
power and compromise the court’s neutrality in adjudicating the resulting
lawsuit. Beyond this particular formal problem, moreover, insofar as enforcement officials must pick and choose between cases because they cannot do
everything, courts will rarely have objective benchmarks for assessing whether
enforcement agencies are focusing on the right priorities, or indeed whether
they are genuinely doing their best at all. The upshot is that exercise of
executive nonenforcement authority, like certain other core executive functions, is effectively a political question, in the peculiar sense of the “political
question doctrine”—it is an area where institutional limitations on courts
place a gap between what executive officials ideally should do and what
9 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 167 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting
DPA), vacated and remanded, Nos. 15-3016, 15-3017, 2016 WL 1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5,
2016).
10 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671
(2014) [hereinafter Price, Enforcement Discretion].
11 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch
has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”
(citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868))); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC,
252 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (asserting that “[o]ne aspect” of the executive “power to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed” is “the prerogative to decline to enforce a
law, or to enforce a law in a particular way” (citing Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union v. Smith,
846 F.2d 1499, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc))).
12 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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courts will require from them. What is more, the twin criteria used to identify political questions more generally, “textual assignment” to a political
branch and absence of “judicially manageable standards,”13 provide key
guideposts for the limits on judicial power over executive enforcement.
Bringing enforcement suits and prosecutions in particular cases is a textually
assigned function of the executive branch, while the broader executive task
of setting priorities for enforcement frequently presents a judicially unmanageable inquiry.
This framework may account descriptively for much of the key current
case law but also carries important normative implications. First, the framework suggests that whatever the limits of the judicial role with respect to nonenforcement, those limits do not ultimately define executive obligations.
The U.S. Justice Department’s own Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) recently
recognized this distinction in its important opinion on one of the Obama
immigration initiatives; courts should as well.14 Second, the framework supports a broader judicial role in some areas. Tracing limits on judicial review
to problems of textual assignment and judicial unmanageability may support
exercising broader review when those particular problems are absent. For
reasons discussed further below, that is true with respect to some current
immigration programs as well as DPAs and some other policies such as a
controversial Bush Administration environmental program. Such government actions should not be categorically unreviewable, even if courts ultimately uphold them on the merits. Finally, and most tentatively, the
framework may have implications for standing analysis. By addressing Article
II concerns about judicial oversight of enforcement more directly, a political
question framework may support rethinking case law that indirectly protects
such prerogatives through constitutional limitations on Article III standing.
In advancing these arguments, my main contribution is to trace nonenforcement’s unreviewability to institutional limits on courts, rather than any
more absolute conception of executive prerogative. Prior scholarship has
tended either to advocate broader judicial review of nonenforcement15 or
13 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (quoting Nixon
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).
14 Office of Legal Counsel, Opinion Letter on the Department of Homeland Security’s
Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States
and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 5 (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritizeremoval.pdf [hereinafter OLC Immigration Opinion] (identifying legal limits on nonenforcement even though “the exercise of enforcement discretion generally is not subject to
judicial review”).
15 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1996)
(analyzing Heckler); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1690 (2004) (advocating arbitrariness review of nonenforcement); Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 253, 285–88 (2003) (examining scope of President’s enforcement discretion
and the nature of judicial review).
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else to read key decisions as enabling presidential administration by leaving
enforcement decisions to raw politics.16 My claim is that executive enforcement obligations instead fall within the family of executive obligations that
are principally matters of political accountability and conscience rather than
judicial enforcement, but that are genuine legal obligations nonetheless.
Approaching the issue from this angle leads me to draw lines with respect to
judicial review of nonenforcement that are similar to lines I drew in prior
work with respect to executive obligation itself. In particular, in both contexts, I distinguish policies that effectively license prohibited conduct from
policies that merely set internal priorities for enforcement. I emphasize
here, however, that for institutional reasons this line is subject to judicial
enforcement in only the clearest cases. As a result, agency nonenforcement
is effectively immune from judicial reversal in many contexts where the
agency’s fidelity to statutory policies could legitimately be questioned as a
matter of first principles.
A secondary aim is to place current litigation over nonenforcement, and
in particular the politically charged litigation over current immigration initiatives, into a broader legal context. The challenged programs are novel in
scale and significance, but the central questions they present—what constitutes faithful enforcement of statutory policies, and what role courts may play
in enforcing any such notion of faithful execution—are recurrent. Indeed,
these questions have arisen in the past primarily in contexts with an opposite
political valence.17 Accordingly, although attempting a synthesis on the eve
of a Supreme Court case that may redefine the field is perilous, my hope is
that placing these programs, as well as the novel practice of DPAs, within a
broader separation-of-powers framework may help clarify what is (and is not)
ultimately at stake in these particular cases.
The Article proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I with a brief account of
the key case law addressing executive nonenforcement, followed by an
16 See, e.g., Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v.
Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 143 (1992) (“Chaney at least implicitly
recognizes that the decisions an agency makes are inevitably political . . . .”); Bressman,
supra note 15, at 1678 (associating Heckler with promoting presidential control of “complex
and essentially political determinations” regarding enforcement priorities). Lisa Schultz
Bressman has proposed treating reviewability as a political question, but in a more limited
sense. Bressman, supra note 15, at 1697–1700. The approach closest to mine is Eric
Biber’s. Biber argues that APA reviewability should turn on a balance between “statutory
supremacy” and “resource allocation” and that general nonenforcement policies should
thus be reviewable but not case-specific decisions. Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource
Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2008) [hereinafter Biber, Resource
Allocation]; see also Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 468 (2008) [hereinafter Biber, Judicial
Review]. Biber, however, does not address the broader separation of powers questions that
I focus on here.
17 For an account of this political reversal including pertinent examples, see Zachary
S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1125–33 (2015) [hereinafter Price, Politics of Nonenforcement]. See also infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
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account of novel executive practices that support renewed attention to the
role of courts in policing it. Part II then develops the argument for treating
law enforcement choices as political questions. I argue first that the function
of bringing particular enforcement suits is “textually assigned” to the executive branch in the peculiar sense of the political question doctrine, and second that many broader enforcement-related choices are “judicially
unmanageable” in the peculiar way courts have used that term. Part III then
addresses my argument’s normative implications with respect to independent
executive legal interpretation, judicial review of nonenforcement policies,
judicial oversight of DPAs, and Article III standing doctrine. The Article concludes with a brief summary placing the argument here in the context of
broader debates over judicial supremacy and the political question doctrine.
I. IMPORTANCE

OF THE

ISSUE

Nonenforcement, as I use the term here, refers to an enforcement official’s deliberate decision not to seek applicable punitive or coercive remedies
against civil or criminal legal violations through judicial or administrative
process. So understood, the term encompasses not only everyday administrative and prosecutorial decisions not to investigate and prosecute possible violations in particular cases, but also broader decisions such as current
controversial immigration and marijuana enforcement policies,18 as well as
earlier de-emphasizing of civil rights, environmental, and labor enforcement
during Republican administrations.19 A general policy, in these terms, may
constitute nonenforcement if it either excludes certain cases from likely
enforcement, or conversely designates some cases for enforcement to the
likely exclusion of others. Sometimes nonenforcement may reflect (or mask)
interpretation. Particularly in administrative contexts where agencies hold
delegated authority to make governing law by interpreting vague, ambiguous,
or open-ended statutory or regulatory requirements, agencies might choose
not to enforce laws in particular contexts because they interpret them not to
apply.20 In other cases, however, prohibitions are clearly applicable yet executive officials may choose not to enforce them in some or all cases.
As we shall see, nonenforcement decisions of this sort can be highly consequential. Yet a series of foundational Supreme Court decisions has largely
(though not completely) foreclosed a judicial role in policing the legality and
reasonableness of executive decisions of this sort, in both criminal and civil
or administrative contexts. Precisely why the Court has taken this hands-off
18 See infra notes 62–65 and accompanying text for description of these policies.
19 I have described some previous examples in Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, supra
note 17, at 1125–33.
20 Absent a statutory directive to the contrary, agencies generally may choose whether
to issue rules or proceed by adjudication. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron
Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 84–86 (1947); see generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383,
1386–403 (2004) (discussing agency choice between proceeding through administrative
enforcement, judicial enforcement, or rulemaking).
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approach has not been entirely clear, however, and the doctrine’s ambiguities have come under pressure as a result of novel executive practices.
A. Vexed Case Law
The Supreme Court’s most important nonenforcement case is Heckler v.
Chaney. There, the Court held that administrative nonenforcement is presumptively unreviewable under the APA.21 In Heckler, death-row inmates
sought judicial review after the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) denied
their petition to enforce drug-misuse laws against state officials administering
capital punishment by lethal injection.22 The APA generally permits review
of any “final agency action.”23 The statute, moreover, expressly defines
“agency action” to include an agency’s “failure to act,”24 and it requires
reviewing courts to “set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”25 In Heckler,
the Court nevertheless interpreted the APA to preclude judicial review of
nonenforcement unless Congress has expressly provided for it.26 The APA
exempts from review actions “committed to agency discretion by law”;27 Heckler held nonenforcement to fall within this category.28
Heckler’s holding was in tension not only with the APA’s express equation
of “action” with “failure to act,” but also with prior doctrinal principles.29 On
21 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985).
22 Id. at 823–24.
23 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 704 (2012).
24 Id. § 551(13).
25 Id. § 706(2). The APA also requires the reviewing court to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” Id. § 706(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to apply “only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a
discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542
U.S. 55, 65 (2004). Insofar as statutes rarely require enforcement specifically in any discrete case, challenging nonenforcement under this standard would be difficult. See PETA
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1097–98 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting challenge under
section 706(1) to “decade-long” nonenforcement of statute with respect to class of cases).
In any event, the exception to review for matters “committed to agency discretion by law”
applies equally to sections 706(1) and (2) and thus, under Heckler, bars review of nonenforcement decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 27–28.
26 470 U.S. at 832–33. In an earlier decision, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
the Court held that a matter may be committed to agency discretion by law, and thus
immune from APA review, if the statutory standard imposed on the agency is so capacious
that there is effectively “no law to apply.” 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79752, at 212 (1945)). The Court in Overton Park emphasized that this exception was “very
narrow.” Id.
27 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
28 470 U.S. at 831–32.
29 For a contemporary appraisal, see Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 657 (1985) (“On its face . . . the APA treats
agency inaction the same as agency action.”); see also, e.g., Magill, supra note 20, at 1421
(observing “[i]t is not easy to pin down exactly why courts resist reviewing”
nonenforcement).
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the whole, the Supreme Court has adopted a robust presumption in favor of
judicial review of administrative action.30 What is more, the Court has interpreted the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review to require reasoned decisionmaking on the part of administrative agencies; though their
review is deferential, courts may thus invalidate even discretionary agency
actions as “arbitrary” if the agency relied on improper considerations or
failed to consider important aspects of the problem.31 Indeed, a central premise of modern administrative law is that such arbitrariness review helps
legitimate agency decisionmaking (despite separation of powers concerns
about its validity) while also improving its accountability and quality.32
Heckler, however, invoked a putative background “tradition” of enforcement discretion as a basis for exempting nonenforcement from the demand
for legitimation through review.33 According to the Heckler Court, nonenforcement is generally “unsuitab[le]” for judicial review not only because it
often turns on “a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are
30 See, e.g., Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015) (“[T]his Court
applies a ‘strong presumption’ favoring judicial review of administrative action.” (quoting
Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986))); Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (“[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.”).
31 As the Supreme Court recently summarized:
Review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential; we will not
vacate an agency’s decision unless it “has relied on factors which Congress had
not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)).
32 For a sampling of literature addressing these points, see for example LOUIS L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965) “The availability of judicial review
is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative
power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”), Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling
Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1319–20 (2014) (describing and critically analyzing this theory), John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 413 (2010) (“[T]he availability of judicial review is thought to make
the agency’s exercise of delegated authority more acceptable by ensuring that its discretion
can be checked against standards set by Congress.”), Jerry Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17,
26 (2001) (“The path of American administrative law has been the progressive submission
of power to reason.”), Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491–92 (2010) (attributing courts’ “expansion of substantive judicial scrutiny of agency decisionmaking” in part to “constitutional concerns with
broad delegations to agencies and the attendant risk of unaccountable and arbitrary exercises of power”), and Sunstein, supra note 29, at 655–56 (describing judicial review as a
“surrogate safeguard[ ]” for concerns reflected in the nondelegation doctrine).
33 470 U.S. at 832.
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peculiarly within its expertise,”34 but also because “an agency’s refusal to
institute proceedings” involves no exercise of “coercive” power35 and
shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in
the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been
regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is
the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”36

In effect, then, if the Court has generally sought to legitimate agencies’ performance of effectively legislative and adjudicatory functions by interpreting
the APA and other statutes to provide for judicial review,37 Heckler reflects a
countervailing impulse to insulate a characteristically executive form of decision from judicial scrutiny.38
Other key enforcement-related decisions have invoked the same mix of
rationales.39 For example, although I concentrate here on nonenforcement
34 Id. at 831–32.
35 Id. at 832. For critique of this rationale, see id. at 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“[O]ne of the very purposes fueling the birth of administrative agencies was the reality
that governmental refusal to act could have just as devastating an effect upon life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness as coercive governmental action.”), and Sunstein, supra note
29, at 674–75 (“[U]nlawful governmental failure to act can be as harmful as unlawful
action and is equally subject to judicial review under APA standards.”).
36 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
37 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 32, at 492 (“[T]his basic requirement of reasoned
explanation is central to alleviating core separation-of-powers concerns associated with the
administrative state.”).
38 Two other key unreviewability cases may reflect a similar impulse to shield traditional executive functions from intrusive judicial oversight. In Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592
(1988), the Court interpreted the governing statute to permit unreviewable, discretionary
terminations of Central Intelligence Agency personnel in part because courts would have
“no basis” for assessing the termination “[s]hort of cross-examination of the Director concerning his views of the Nation’s security and whether the discharged employee was inimical to those interests.” Id. at 600; see also id. at 608–09 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting
the APA to incorporate a common law of unreviewability based in part on “a traditional
respect for the functions of the other branches”). Similarly, in Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S.
182, 193 (1993), the Court held allocation of funds from lump-sum appropriations to be
unreviewable based on an asserted traditional understanding that “the very point of a
lump-sum appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in what it sees as the most effective or desirable way.” Id. at 192. Some have also described Heckler, along with the decision in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), from the preceding year, as facilitating a more presidential model of administration by carving out broader
areas of agency autonomy from judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 15, at 1678
(associating Heckler with promoting presidential control of “complex and essentially political determinations” regarding enforcement priorities); Thomas, supra note 16, at 143
(“[A]s with the Court’s Chevron decision a year earlier, Chaney at least implicitly recognizes
that the decisions an agency makes are inevitably political . . . .”).
39 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761, 765 (2005) (rejecting
claimed Fourteenth Amendment right to enforcement of state-law restraining order
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for constitutionally permissible reasons,40 the Court has given narrow scope
to even constitutional claims based on the same mix of concerns evident in
Heckler. In the criminal context, the Court has recognized that equal protection principles forbid racially motivated prosecution, yet the Court has given
this “selective prosecution” doctrine exceedingly narrow scope.41 Once
again, a key asserted reason for doing so is concern about undue interference with a putative executive prerogative. The Court thus held in United
States v. Armstrong that allowing discovery on a selective prosecution claim
without a strong threshold showing of discriminatory intent would “impair
the performance of a core executive constitutional function.”42 Federal prosecutors, the Court explained, generally hold broad charging discretion
“because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to help
him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.’ ”43 Also as in Heckler, however, the Court invoked “an
assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and courts.”44 The
Court explained: “Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s
general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not
readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to
undertake.”45
Finally, the Supreme Court has also insulated nonenforcement from
judicial challenge through its interpretation of the Article III “case or controversy” requirement.46 In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., the Court rejected a single
mother’s claimed standing to challenge state criminal non-prosecution of
fathers who failed to pay child support.47 Noting that in general “a citizen
lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he
himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution,” the Court
because of the “deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion” and because of doubts
that “state law gave respondent an entitlement to enforcement of the mandate”).
40 The Heckler Court reserved the question whether nonenforcement on racial or
other constitutional grounds would be unreviewable. 470 U.S. at 838. The Court has since
held that even when an employment termination decision was “committed to agency discretion by law” under the APA because the statute failed to permit “application of any
meaningful judicial standard of review,” the Court could nonetheless consider “colorable
constitutional claim[s]” arising out of the termination. Webster, 486 U.S. at 600, 603.
41 See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)
(rejecting selective-prosecution defense to deportation proceedings and noting that even
in criminal prosecutions “we have emphasized that the standard for proving [selectiveprosecution defenses] is particularly demanding, requiring a criminal defendant to introduce ‘clear evidence’ displacing the presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully”
(quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–65 (1996))).
42 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
43 Id. at 464 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
44 Id. at 465.
45 Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)); see also Reno, 525
U.S. at 489–90 (same).
46 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
47 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
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held that the mother demonstrated “an insufficient showing of a direct nexus
between the vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the State’s
criminal laws.”48 The Court in Linda R.S. appeared to view this holding only
as a default; it implied that a clear statute might establish standing.49 But in
two subsequent cases, Allen v. Wright50 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,51 the
Court constitutionalized the requirement of “concrete” injury, traceable to
the challenged conduct and redressable by the court, to challenge all forms
of government inaction. In both cases, moreover, the Court invoked the
President’s putative Article II prerogative to control law enforcement as a
central reason for restricting the class of injuries sufficient to establish an
Article III case or controversy.52
Across a range of contexts, then, the Supreme Court has erected barriers
to judicial scrutiny of executive enforcement choices.53 Yet the Court’s rea48 Id.
49 See id. at 617 n.3 (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”).
50 468 U.S. 737, 739–40 (1984).
51 504 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1992).
52 Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (holding that the Constitution’s assignment “to the Executive
Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed’” supports denying “standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus
established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties”); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at
577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to
permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most
important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”).
In footnotes in two more recent cases, the Supreme Court asserted that standing limits
derive entirely from Article III, not Article II. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
102 n.4 (1998). Nevertheless, the Court has adhered firmly to the notion that plaintiffs
lack standing to challenge legal nonenforcement unless the government’s inaction causes
them some specific personal injury that differentiates them from the public at large. See,
e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2656, 2668 (2013). What is more, in scholarly
writing both Justice Scalia (Lujan’s author) and Chief Justice Roberts (Hollingsworth’s
author) have forcefully advocated an Article II basis for limits on Article III standing. See
John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1230 (1993)
(“The Article III standing requirement that the judiciary act only at the behest of a plaintiff
suffering injury in fact . . . ensures that the court is carrying out its function of deciding a
case or controversy, rather than fulfilling the executive’s responsibility of taking care that
the laws be faithfully executed.”); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 896 (1983) (“Where the
courts, in the supposed interest of all the people, do enforce upon the executive branch
adherence to legislative policies that the political process itself would not enforce, they are
likely (despite the best of intentions) to be enforcing the political prejudices of their own
class.”).
53 Two other APA doctrines, finality and ripeness, may also obstruct judicial review of
nonenforcement. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review
of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 375–85 (2011) (describing doctrines and critically analyzing their application to guidance documents). Because these doctrines apply
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soning in key decisions has combined rationales based on presumed executive authority with rationales based on presumed judicial incapacity. Beyond
these ambiguities of rationale, moreover, the doctrine carries important
ambiguities of scope. Heckler, in particular, has spawned conflicting case law
regarding precisely what sorts of executive decisions it exempts from judicial
oversight.54 At the same time, novel executive practices (and resulting litigation challenging them) have given new salience to questions about the
proper judicial role with respect to nonenforcement.
B. Contemporary Salience
The Court’s decisions regarding judicial review of nonenforcement matter because nonenforcement is an endemic feature of federal criminal justice
and many areas of administrative law. As a practical matter, federal agencies
rarely have the wherewithal to fully enforce the laws they administer. To give
just a few examples, federal prosecutors could never plausibly detect and
punish every crime covered by the vast federal criminal code;55 federal immigration officials estimate that with current resources they can remove at most
400,000 undocumented immigrants annually out of a population of roughly
eleven million;56 the Internal Revenue Service can audit at most one percent
of tax returns each year;57 and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, even in combination with state partner agencies, annually inspects
only about 83,000 worksites out of more than eight million within its jurisdiction.58 Enforcement officials must pick and choose, and their choices may
have profound effects on regulated parties’ incentives to comply with applicable prohibitions. Yet even apart from nonenforcement’s overall importance,
at least two important new developments, both occurring against a backdrop
of increasing partisan polarization and legislative paralysis, have given
renewed salience to the issue.
generally and have not specifically targeted nonenforcement, I do not focus directly on
them here. These doctrines at any rate have not uniformly prevented consideration of
nonenforcement where Heckler has been held not to apply. For a proposal to “massage”
them to enable broader judicial review of guidance documents in general, see id.
54 Compare, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1030 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (deeming general policy of entering identical consent decrees with certain polluters
unreviewable), and Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (deeming
unreviewable agency’s failure to prevent construction of allegedly unlawful pollution-emitting facilities), with Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 675–76 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (deeming general enforcement policies reviewable), and Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d
1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (reviewing refusal to prevent importation of unlawful medications).
55 See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1423 (2008) (“As Congress well understands when it enacts federal
criminal proscriptions, both prosecutorial and sentencing discretion are inevitable because
of the broad reach of these proscriptions and the severity of authorized punishments.”).
56 OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 1.
57 Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 241, 258 (2013).
58 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, COMMONLY USED STATISTICS,
https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html (reporting figures for fiscal year 2014).
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One trend is the increasingly overt and deliberate formulation of nonenforcement policies by presidential administrations.59 In a world of extensive
federal law, partisan disagreement over the merits of that law, and pervasive
resource constraints and practical limits on enforcement, political disputes
over how executive agencies go about giving effect to those laws may well be
inevitable, particularly during periods of divided government. At any rate,
the issue has been a matter of recurrent political conflict in recent administrations. For instance, the Reagan and two Bush Administrations deliberately
deemphasized enforcement of disfavored laws, both by lowering overall levels
of enforcement and pursuing conciliatory rather than coercive remedies in
cases they did pursue.60 Critics persistently faulted these administrations for
lax enforcement of environmental, labor, consumer protection, and civil
rights laws they disfavored as a matter of policy.61
In the Obama Administration, the issue reemerged with opposite partisan alignments. Particular controversy has centered on two controversial
immigration programs, “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” (DACA)
and “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents” (DAPA).62 Under these programs, in an asserted exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, the administration has invited large categories of
undocumented immigrants to apply for three-year (formally revocable)
promises of non-removal known as “deferred action”; those receiving
deferred action face no effective threat of removal while the deferral remains
in effect and (among other benefits) may be eligible for work authorization,
despite general prohibitions on employment of undocumented immigrants.63 Earlier, the administration also sparked controversy with an
announced criminal enforcement policy (now partially codified by appropriations restrictions64) that limits prosecution of state-approved marijuana
businesses despite federal statutes criminalizing possession and distribution
of the drug.65
59 See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1054–69
(2013) (discussing this development).
60 For a description of this history, see Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, supra note 17, at
1125–33.
61 Id.
62 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012);
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León
Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014). For the
Obama Administration’s legal justification for the latter of these policies, see OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 12–20.
63 For further description of the programs, see for example Adam B. Cox & Cristina
M. Rodriguez, The President & Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 131–33 (2015).
64 See Pub. L. No. 113-235, tit. II, § 538 (2015) (barring use of Justice Department
funds “to prevent such States from implementing their own State laws that authorize the
use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana”).
65 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (Feb. 14,
2014) [hereinafter 2014 Cole Memorandum]; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy
Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Cole Memorandum]; Memo-
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In their scale and significance, these policies highlight both the potential real-world impact of nonenforcement and the separation of powers
dimension of the issue. These policies have quite a tangible impact, reflected
in the flourishing of overt marijuana businesses in some states and the opportunity for millions of immigrant families to come out of the shadows. Yet in
neither case can the executive branch plausibly interpret governing substantive laws not to cover the conduct in question; marijuana possession is concededly a federal crime,66 and immigrants benefiting from DACA and DAPA
are concededly removable under governing statutes.67 The only question is
the scope of executive authority to enforce or not enforce those laws. Both
policies, moreover, responded to political pressures on the president to mitigate laws that are deeply unpopular with his constituents, but that opponents
in Congress have resisted amending.68 These controversies thus raise
directly the question of how presidential administrations should view
enforcement responsibilities with respect to laws they disfavor.
At the same time, at least one development at the ground level of federal
enforcement raises related questions about the scope and nature of nonenforcement authority. In federal criminal law enforcement, prosecutors have
increasingly relied on DPAs, rather than actual criminal convictions, to
redress suspected corporate wrongdoing.69 In such agreements, the government files criminal charges with the court, but enters a court-approved agreement to “defer” prosecution in exchange for the defendant’s acceptance of
specified conditions.70 (Relatedly, the government has also increasingly used
non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), which are not court-approved, for similar purposes.71) Court approval of DPAs enables the government to avoid
Speedy Trial Act deadlines for commencing trial.72 But unlike plea agreerandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Cole Memorandum].
66 See 2014 Cole Memorandum, supra note 65 (“Congress has determined that marijuana is a dangerous drug and that the illegal sale and distribution of marijuana is a serious
crime.”).
67 See OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 1 (describing deferred action as
providing “a form of temporary administrative relief from removal”).
68 See, e.g., Matt Ford, A Ruling Against the Obama Administration on Immigration, ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 2015) (noting that the policies were adopted following “considerable pressure from immigration-reform activists” and after “the defeat of comprehensive
immigration reform in Congress”), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/
11/fifth-circuit-obama-immigration/415077/.
69 The government apparently first entered a DPA in the corporate context in 1992,
but by 2001, the government has entered at least 250 such agreements with corporate
offenders, including over 100 between 2010 and 2012. BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO
JAIL 5, 17–33, 55–56 (2014); Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect
and the Impact on the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293,
1309–10 (2014).
70 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012) (excluding time from deadlines for trial if court
approves agreement).
71 GARRETT, supra note 69, at 76.
72 Id.
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ments and civil consent decrees, such agreements do not formally resolve
alleged criminal or civil violations with an adjudicated judgment of liability.73
Instead the agreements leverage non-prosecution to impose affirmative obligations on the defendant—obligations that have included paying substantial
fines, adopting internal reforms, making changes in corporate management,
accepting intrusive outside monitoring, and, in the most notorious cases,
endowing a law school professorship and ensuring state tax revenue.74
Though DPAs have been attacked by some as too harsh75 and others as too
lenient,76 recent scholarship has raised important questions about whether
they genuinely advance policy goals underlying criminal statutes.77
Much like assertive nonenforcement policies, DPAs involve deliberate
use of nonenforcement (albeit of a peculiar type) to reshape the environment in which regulated parties operate. Both practices, moreover, involve
enforcement officials stepping into perceived policy gaps opened up by partisan paralysis and legislative incapacity. No doubt President Obama’s first
choice would have been legislation granting legal status to undocumented
immigrants and relaxing federal criminal prohibitions on marijuana. Faced
with partisan opposition in Congress, however, nonenforcement provided a
means of adjusting the law on the ground to better conform to his constitu73 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (procedures for guilty pleas); SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he proper standard for reviewing a proposed consent judgment involving an enforcement agency requires that the district court
determine whether the proposed consent decree is fair and reasonable, with the additional
requirement that the ‘public interest would not be disserved,’ in the event that the consent
decree includes injunctive relief.” (citation omitted) (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006))); GARRETT, supra note 69, at 162–63, 282 (contrasting DPAs and
NPAs with plea agreements and civil consent decrees).
74 GARRETT, supra note 69, at 76–77.
75 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has It Gone Too Far?, 27 NAT’L L.J.,
13 (2005) (“[P]rosecutors are starting to possess something close to absolute power.”); The
Criminalisation of American Business, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2014, at 9 (describing criminal
settlements as “shakedowns”); Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116468395737834160 (“The agreements often read like the confessions of a Stalinist purge trial, as battered corporations
recant their past sins and submit to punishments wildly in excess of any underlying
offense.”); cf. Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial
Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM 62, 63 (Anthony
S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (arguing that “prosecutors should not impose
structural reforms on nonindicted corporations”).
76 See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (“Although it is supposedly
justified because it prevents future crimes, I suggest that the future deterrent value of successfully prosecuting individuals far outweighs the prophylactic benefits of imposing internal compliance measures that are often little more than window-dressing.”). For general
accounts of the two sides of the debate, see Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 69, at 1312–15,
and Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 277–80
(2014).
77 See GARRETT, supra note 69, at 281–84 (discussing concerns).
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ents’ preferences without obtaining affirmative change of the law on the
books. Similarly, many proponents of DPAs no doubt would prefer greater
oversight and enforcement capacity on the part of regulatory agencies. But
in a world of scarce resources and powerful political opposition to new civil
regulation, DPAs have enabled the leveraging of criminal law to obtain prospective reforms of troubled organizations.78
Again, however, both these developments underscore the potential significance of nonenforcement. The Justice Department’s marijuana enforcement guidelines have prompted development of vast marijuana industries in
some states. The Department of Homeland Security’s initiatives potentially
shield millions of immigrants from removal. DPAs have imposed millions of
dollars in fines and extensive organizational changes. These are policy
effects of the first order, but no clear lawmaking delegation underlies them,
only the negative discretion not to enforce laws already on the books, or to
leverage such nonenforcement to achieve alternative aims. Critics have thus
argued for a more assertive judicial role, and current litigation over the
immigration initiatives and DPAs has raised anew the question whether
courts can or should play any role in defining and enforcing limits on executive nonenforcement.79
II. A POLITICAL QUESTION FRAMEWORK
Executive law-enforcement obligations should be understood to present
a form of political question—an issue, that is, on which structural constitutional considerations support placing a gap between executive duties and
judicial enforcement of those duties. Courts’ reluctance to bridge that gap is
often well-founded, but for reasons relating primarily to judicial capacity and
institutional competence, not limitations on congressional authority, executive obligation, or the case or controversy requirement. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has been correct to emphasize the “unsuitability” of nonenforcement for judicial review, but wrong to infer “absolute” executive discretion from judicial unmanageability, and equally wrong to shoehorn concerns
about intrusion on executive inaction into constitutional standing doctrine.
Reframing the issue in this way reveals, moreover, that courts’ hands-off attitude towards nonenforcement is not always justified. As discussed in Part III,
in some important contexts, including approval of DPAs and review of some
unusual general nonenforcement policies, courts might police important
78 See id. at 266–68 (arguing that prosecutors are “crucial to filling the gap left by
regulators who may lack adequate resources to punish the most severe corporate violators”
and that “prosecutions may be symptoms of regulatory failures”); Richman, supra note 76,
at 280 (“Criminal sanctions will simply be the ‘second-best preference’ of those who would
really prefer a very different regulatory (or deregulated) regime.”).
79 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
906 (2016) (challenge to deferred action program); United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79
F. Supp. 3d 160, 167 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting DPA), vacated and remanded, Nos. 15-3016,
15-3017, 2016 WL 1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2016).
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boundaries to executive nonenforcement authority without overstepping
their proper role.
Before turning to such normative issues, I offer in this Part a descriptive
account of existing doctrine rooted in the political question criteria of “textual assignment” and “judicial unmanageability.” Section A briefly describes
the political question doctrine, while Sections B and C explore the applicability of these twin criteria to executive nonenforcement.
A. Political Question Criteria
The animating idea of the political question doctrine is that some legal
obligations defy judicial enforcement. As one lower court recently put it, “a
question is ‘political’ and thus nonjusticiable when its adjudication would
inject the courts into a controversy which is best suited to resolution by the
political branches.”80 On this theory, lower courts have repeatedly dismissed
cases questioning particular applications of military force,81 as well as cases
challenging certain executive foreign policy decisions.82 The Supreme Court
has declined to resolve the adequacy of a Senate impeachment trial and the
sufficiency of National Guard training and oversight,83 a plurality has
deemed constitutional prohibitions on political gerrymandering to be judicially unenforceable,84 and four Justices have suggested that the Senate’s
constitutional role in treaty termination is non-justiciable.85 Courts in all
these contexts have distinguished justiciability from the merits. “In invoking
the political question doctrine,” the Court has said, “a court acknowledges
the possibility that a constitutional provision may not be judicially enforcea80 Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2015).
81 Id. at 178 (rejecting claim based on “accidental killing of [plaintiff’s] husband and
the intentional sinking of her husband’s fishing vessel during a NATO counter-piracy mission”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“If
the political question doctrine means anything in the arena of national security and foreign relations, it means the courts cannot assess the merits of the President’s decision to
launch an attack on a foreign target . . . .”); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46–52
(D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting challenge to military targeting of alleged terrorist overseas).
82 Li-Shou, 777 F.3d at 180 (“[I]t is not within the purview of ‘judicial competence’ to
review purely military decisions.” (quoting Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir.
2012))); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus., 607 F.3d at 842 (“The political question doctrine bars our
review of claims that, regardless of how they are styled, call into question the prudence of
the political branches in matters of foreign policy or national security constitutionally committed to their discretion.”); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he decision to establish a military base [overseas] is not reviewable.”).
83 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (impeachment trials); Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (National Guard).
84 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion).
85 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he
basic question presented by the petitioners in this case is ‘political’ and therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s
foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to
negate the action of the President.”).
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ble. Such a decision is of course very different from determining that specific
congressional action does not violate the Constitution.”86
Insofar as law enforcement, no less than war powers or foreign affairs, is
a central constitutional function of the executive branch, recognizing it as a
political question could create a certain doctrinal symmetry. But what
defines a political question? As a matter of doctrine, a vague six-factor test
outlined in Baker v. Carr supposedly governs the identification of political
questions:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.87

In its more recent cases, the Supreme Court has emphasized the first two
Baker v. Carr factors, “textually demonstrable . . . commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department” and “lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it.”88
The first of these two seems to reflect an assumption, dating to Marbury
v. Madison,89 that certain judgments are assigned specifically to another
branch and thus beyond judicial power.90 As the Court observed in Marbury,
the Constitution “invest[s]” the President “with certain important political
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience.”91 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall placed
the President’s power to appoint federal officers within this category.92 The
exercise of this authority, Marshall explained, “respect[s] the nation, not
individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the
executive is conclusive.”93 In more recent cases, the Court has emphasized
86 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992) (footnotes omitted)
(citing MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 116–17 (1991);
Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599 (1976)).
87 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
88 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (quoting Nixon
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).
89 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
90 This so-called “classical” view of the doctrine is associated with Herbert Wechsler.
See HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 11–14 (1961).
91 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–66.
92 Id; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
93 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166. For discussion of Marshall’s understanding of
political questions, see Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2
GREEN BAG 2d 367 (1999).
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that text alone is generally insufficient to create textual assignment; textual
assignment in the relevant sense instead requires particular institutional reasons not to involve the judiciary.94 After all, nearly every government function is constitutionally assigned to one branch or another, yet courts
normally enforce constitutional limits on the exercise of those functions.
The second criterion, absence of judicially manageable standards, is
even more mysterious. As one commentator summarizes, the Court “has suggested that a judicially manageable rule must be ‘principled, rational, and
based upon reasoned distinctions,’ in contrast to a legislated rule, which ‘can
be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc.’ ”95 The concept, so described, seems
to put the cart before the horse, at least in the constitutional context. To
quote another commentator, “Judicially manageable standards . . . are far
more often the products or outputs of constitutional adjudication than inherent elements of the Constitution’s meaning.”96 That is to say, in our system
of constitutional adjudication, courts normally give determinate content to
amorphous standards through doctrinal elaboration, rather than throwing
up their hands at the outset. Accordingly, this political question factor,
much like textual assignment, seems ultimately to turn on a judgment of relative institutional competence—a determination that judicial line-drawing
would infringe on judgments that another branch is better positioned to
make.97 On some accounts, for example, the constitutional prohibition on
delegation of legislative power is judicially unenforced because it is judicially
unmanageable: courts’ ungoverned policy preferences would inevitably
infect any judgment that Congress has gone too far, so the question is best
left to the political process.98 Similarly, in deferring to executive judgments
94 See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2012) (contrasting textual assignment of a particular power with “exclusive commitment” of authority
to decide an issue); id. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (characterizing the “textual
assignment” factor as covering cases in which “the Constitution itself requires that another
branch resolve the question presented”); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)
(“[T]he courts must, in the first instance, interpret the text in question and determine
whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed.”); see also generally John Harrison, The Relation Between Limitations on and Requirements of Article III Adjudication, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 1367, 1375 (2007) (“[T]he fear that drives judicial reticence in political question
cases is about second-guessing highly sensitive and discretionary decisions, even when
those decisions are about or substantially constrained by legal principles.”).
95 Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 (2013) (quoting
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
96 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1277 (2006).
97 Cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, “No Law to Apply”, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (criticizing Heckler v. Chaney because “when an American court is confronted with an entirely
new problem that is governed by no statute and by no prior decision, it never says it must
give up for lack of law to apply; it creates whatever law is needed to decide the case”).
98 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (“[W]e have
‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))); John F. Manning,
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with respect to war powers and foreign affairs, courts often “couple a determination that they lack competence to make factual or predictive judgments
with a conclusion that another institution is both better situated and constitutionally obliged to make the requisite assessments.”99
Outside the constitutional context, courts have also deemed certain statutory standards “judicially unmanageable.” Their approach there reflects the
same emphasis on relative institutional competence. Just last term, for example, the Supreme Court held in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center that certain statutory standards for state Medicaid reimbursement were not subject to
private equitable enforcement, in part because of the “judicially unadministrable nature” of the statutory standard.100 The provision in question
required state Medicaid plans to provide for reimbursement of certain services at rates:
[N]ecessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and
services and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy,
and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care
and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care
and services are available to the general population in the geographic
area.101

In the Court’s view, any judicial determination of this standard’s meaning
would be “judgment-laden”; it would turn on multifaceted policy considerations that politically accountable administrators could evaluate with greater
legitimacy and competence than courts.102 Accordingly, “[t]he sheer complexity associated with enforcing [this standard], coupled with the express
provision of an administrative remedy” (in the form of withholding of federal
funds by the Secretary of Health and Human Services), established congressional intent to make the public enforcement remedy exclusive.103
Can law enforcement choices qualify as political questions by these standards? Historically, key authorities, including John Marshall himself in an
important floor speech as a member of Congress, described law enforcement
Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 901 (2004) (arguing that “[T]he central
inquiry in a nondelegation case necessarily asks what degree of legislatively conferred discretion crosses the line from permissible law implementation to an impermissible delegation of legislative power” and that “this question reduces to little better than an I-know-itwhen-see-it test”); see also Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1786 (2012) (“The danger is too grave that if courts
attempted to police the boundaries of permissible delegation, they would approve of delegations that seemed to them necessary in light of policy realities, and disapprove of those
that did not. This would be a usurpation of the legislative function.”). Some, of course,
argue instead that the non-delegation doctrine is unenforced because it does not exist.
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1721 (2002).
99 Fallon, supra note 96, at 1277.
100 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015).
101 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2012).
102 Exceptional Child Center, 135 S. Ct. at 1385.
103 Id.
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as a textually assigned function of the executive branch and thus no province
of the courts.104 More broadly, in its important Reconstruction-era decision
Mississippi v. Johnson, the Supreme Court characterized faithful execution of
federal regulatory statutes as a non-justiciable presidential duty.105 According to the Court, “the duty of the President in the exercise of the power to
see that the laws are faithfully executed, and among these laws the acts
named in the bill,” was “purely executive and political.”106 “An attempt on
the part of the judicial department of the government to enforce the performance of such duties by the President might be justly characterized, in the
language of Chief Justice Marshal [sic] as ‘an absurd and excessive
extravagance.’ ”107
Given subsequent doctrinal developments, Mississippi v. Johnson’s categorical exclusion of faithful execution from judicial oversight could not be
transposed wholesale into modern doctrine without significant disruption.
Courts in Johnson’s day understood separation of powers to preclude direct
review of any discretionary executive function.108 Today, in contrast,
although the President’s own actions remain unreviewable for abuse of discretion under the APA,109 review of discretionary agency decisions is otherwise routine and provides important legitimation for broad delegations to
administrative agencies.110 To the extent modern judicial review under the
APA and other statutes departs from the “separate spheres” conception of
separation of powers underlying Johnson and other early authorities, the
question why nonenforcement remains exempt from judicial review becomes
harder.111 But even under the more modest criteria for political questions
104 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 615 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall).
105 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 499 (1866).
106 Id.
107 Id. In a new article tracing the historical origins of the political question doctrine,
Tara Grove suggests that Mississippi v. Johnson was a political question case only insofar as it
involved a state’s assertion of “sovereign ‘political rights’ in court,” a matter she asserts
courts would address today as a matter of standing doctrine. Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost
History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1916 n.30 (2015). Though
Grove’s argument is compelling in other respects, this account of Johnson overlooks the
Court’s description of faithful execution as a “purely executive and political” responsibility.
Mississippi, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 499; cf. Harrison, supra note 94, at 1375 (“[T]he fear that
drives judicial reticence in political question cases is about second-guessing highly sensitive
and discretionary decisions, even when those decisions are about or substantially constrained by legal principles.”).
108 For background on nineteenth-century judicial review of executive action, see JERRY
L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION (2012); Bagley, supra note 32, at
1294–1303; Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 946–53 (2011); Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197,
206–09 (1991).
109 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992).
110 See supra Section I.A.
111 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 32, at 1294–1301 (contrasting the nineteenth-century
approach with the modern presumption of reviewability).
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reflected in modern doctrine, there remains a kernel of truth to Johnson’s
holding. Seeing why requires separately unpacking limitations on judicial
authority that apply under idealized baseline conditions, on the one hand,
and messier modern enforcement realities, on the other.
B. Separation of Powers at Baseline: Textual Assignment
To clarify the scope of judicial power over executive enforcement, I consider first the division of authority that would obtain under idealized baseline
conditions: If Congress enacted a civil or criminal prohibition, provided adequate resources for full enforcement, and provided some otherwise valid
mechanism for judicial review of nonenforcement decisions, could a federal
court compel executive officials to bring a prosecution or enforcement
action before it in the particular case?
For compelling textual, structural, and normative reasons, the answer is
no. Allowing such judicially compelled prosecution would collapse any
meaningful distinction between executive and judicial power in the enforcement context. At the same time, it would compromise courts’ core function
of guaranteeing due process to defendants in public enforcement suits. But
this limit on judicial power is narrow: it does not preclude judicial review of
administrative nonenforcement, nor even more indirect review of the government’s reasons for proceeding or not proceeding in a particular case
through judicial process. Nor does it reflect any more absolute executive
prerogative to decline enforcement. Any obligation to bring particular
enforcement suits is instead a political question of the “textually assigned”
variety—an obligation binding on executive officials as a matter of politics
and conscience but not judicial enforcement.
To start with the text itself, the Take Care Clause specifically assigns
responsibility for law enforcement to the executive branch.112 Article II thus
plausibly implies, by negative inference, that courts lack authority to direct
the enforcement of federal laws. At a most basic level, in law enforcement
contexts, faithful execution of federal laws requires identifying legal violations and pursuing appropriate remedies. That responsibility, in turn, often
requires bringing appropriate cases before federal courts, which then function as neutral arbiters between the government and individual defendants.113 Court-ordered prosecution of particular parties would violate this
understanding: it would involve the court in adjudicating legal violations
identified by the court on its own initiative, just as much as if the court compelled a private party to bring a particular claim before it for resolution. A
112 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed”).
113 For a colorful early expression of this idea, see ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 293 (Liberty Fund 1999)
(1803) (“The judiciary . . . is that department of the government to whom the protection
of the rights of the individual is by the constitution especially confided, interposing its
shield between him and the sword of usurped authority, the darts of oppression, and the
shafts of faction and violence.”).
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prohibition on court-ordered official prosecution thus ensures that a parallel
rule of party-presentation applies equally to public and private litigants.114
On a more functional level, allowing court-ordered prosecution in particular cases would collapse any meaningful separation between executive
and judicial power. At the time of the founding, “the division of executive
and judicial power into two separate branches [of government] was a relative
novelty in political theory.”115 Yet foundational theorists described the separation as an essential protection for liberty. As James Madison, quoting Montesquieu, observed in The Federalist No. 47: “Were [the power of judging]
joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence
of an oppressor.”116 By requiring three discrete steps for criminal or civil
punishment—legislative enactment, executive prosecution, and judicial
determination of guilt—the Constitution’s tripartite scheme of separated
powers stacks the deck in favor of liberty, making unwarranted or unjustified
sanctions less likely.117 What is more, separated executive and judicial power
ensures determination of the defendant’s due process rights by a neutral
adjudicator with no predetermined interest in the case’s outcome.118
114 For discussion of the party-presentation requirement in private litigation, see Scott
Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–12, 25–33
(2014). In some conventional forms of litigation such as shareholder derivative suits, the
court notionally compels an entity to pursue civil claims against other parties, but in such
cases the compulsion to bring suit is effectively a legal fiction to enable litigation between
conflicting underlying interests (such as shareholders and managers).
115 Powell, How Does the Constitution Structure Government?, in A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT
27 (B. Marshall ed., 1987)); Woolhandler, supra note 108, at 214 (citing M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 154–55 (Liberty Fund 2d ed. 1998)
(1967)); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787,
at 159–61 (1998) (discussing revolutionary-era difficulties “fit[ting] the judiciary into the
scheme of government”).
116 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (quoting Montesquieu); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258 (1765) (emphasizing that the king’s role as prosecutor in criminal cases would make it an “absurdity[ ] if the
king personally sate in judgment”); id. at 260 (“Nothing . . . is more to be avoided, in a free
constitution, than uniting the provinces of a judge and a minister of state.”).
117 See, e.g., In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Paradoxically, the
plenary prosecutorial power of the executive branch safeguards liberty, for, in conjunction
with the plenary legislative power of Congress, it assures that no one can be convicted of a
crime without the concurrence of all three branches . . . .”); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1017 (2006); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated
Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1536–38 & n.102 (1991).
118 The Supreme Court has recognized a related principle of judicial neutrality as a
requirement of due process. In In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 134, 139 (1955), the Court
held that a judge who approved criminal charges as a “one-man grand jury” could not
preside over the resulting trial. Id. at 139 (“We hold that it was a violation of due process
for the ‘judge-grand jury’ to try these petitioners.”). The Court explained: “Having been a
part of [the single-judge grand-jury] process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of
things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused. While he
would not likely have all the zeal of a prosecutor, it can certainly not be said that he would
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Federal courts have thus rejected suits to compel criminal enforcement,
even when underlying statutes seem to require it.119 Early in the country’s
history, Federalist judges attempted on at least two occasions to compel criminal enforcement.120 But the District Attorney and grand jury rebuffed the
judges’ efforts in one case,121 and in the other, Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Chase was impeached.122 Early practice thus established an enduring prohibition against judicially compelled prosecution. More recently,
although the Civil Rights Act of 1866 purports to require executive enforce-

have none of that zeal.” Id. at 137; see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868,
887 (2009) (involving judge bias and recusal for purposes of due process).
119 See, e.g., Otero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 832 F.2d 141, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987); Ross v. U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 524, 524 (9th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1973);
Bass Anglers Sportsman’s Soc’y of Am. v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339, 346
(E.D. Tenn. 1971); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Pugach v.
Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); cf. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 181
(5th Cir. 1965).
120 See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 195 (1926)
(describing one such instance); Richard Ellis, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase, in AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRIALS 60 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1994) (describing another).
121 JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION 150 (2002); WARREN, supra note 120, at
196–97.
122 One article of impeachment accused Justice Chase of “authoritatively enjoin[ing]”
the executive branch to prosecute. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 327 (1804). In discussing this
charge at his trial in the Senate, the House managers advocating Chase’s removal emphasized that such intrusion on independent executive judgment violated a constitutional obligation of neutrality—a duty, that is, to serve as an “impartial dispenser[ ] of justice between
such as might resort [to the federal courts] for an adjustment of their differences.” Id.
Although the Senate ultimately acquitted Chase on all charges, even his attorneys appear
not to have disputed the managers’ conception of the proper judicial role. Id. at 543
(admitting “that he requested the District Attorney to assist [the grand jury] with his advice
in making this inquiry”); see also id. at 549 (emphasizing Chase’s acquiescence in the DA’s
and grand jury’s determination that no crime occurred); id. at 142 (characterizing allegations in the article as “altogether erroneous”); id. at 144 (contending that it was Chase’s
“duty, when informed of an offence, which the grand jury had overlooked, to direct their
attention towards it, and to request for them, and even to require, if necessary, the aid of
the District Attorney in making their inquiries”). In any event, historians have pointed to
Chase’s trial as a watershed in chastening overzealous early judges and entrenching a more
limited conception of the judicial role. See, e.g., R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 179 (2001); STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL
MISUNDERSTANDING 156–58 (1991); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 422–25 (2009);
Ellis, supra note 120, at 57–73.
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ment,123 even very sympathetic federal courts rejected civil rights–era efforts
to compel prosecutions under the statute.124
To be sure, some authorities suggest that courts lack power to compel
prosecution because executive officials have no obligation to prosecute in the
first place.125 As I have elsewhere argued, however, while some degree of
enforcement discretion is a natural incident of the executive function, Article
II’s requirement of faithful execution is at odds with presuming unbounded
executive nonenforcement authority, particularly in civil and administrative
contexts.126 Furthermore, when Congress affirmatively mandates enforcement, as it has done in some important statutes, the enforcement mandate
itself is a law that the executive branch must faithfully execute.127 Congress
cannot mandate enforcement even when the executive branch deems it factually unjustified; any such mandate would itself violate separation of powers
by collapsing the distinction between legislative and executive power.128 But
short of that narrow limit on congressional power, Congress may impose
enforcement obligations that are binding as a matter of politics and conscience, even if courts cannot directly enforce them.
At any rate, and more to the point here, a narrow prohibition on judicially compelled prosecution comports better with the case law than any
broader theory of preclusive executive nonenforcement power. In contexts
where the issue has most directly presented itself, courts have in fact come
close to embracing this understanding explicitly. In Dunlop v. Bachowski, for
example, the Supreme Court applied a statute requiring the Secretary of
Labor to bring civil suits in response to certain labor violations.129 In doing
so, it recognized no constitutional difficulty with exercising judicial review
over executive nonenforcement decisions, but nevertheless avoided deciding
“the question whether the district court is empowered to order the Secretary
123 42 U.S.C. § 1987 (2012); Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 4, 14 Stat. 27, 28 (providing
“[t]hat the district attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals of the United States . . . shall
be, and they are hereby, specially authorized and required, at the expense of the United
States, to institute proceedings against all and every person who shall violate the provisions
of this act, and cause him or them to be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case
may be, for trial before such court of the United States or territorial court as by this act has
cognizance of the offence”). This law presumably reflected Congress’s suspicion that President Andrew Johnson, who would later be impeached for obstructing Reconstruction,
could not be trusted with discretionary nonenforcement power. See Note, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALE L.J. 1297, 1306–07 (1965).
124 See, e.g., Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575, 577 (6th Cir. 1970); Moses v. Kennedy, 219
F. Supp. 762, 765–66 (D.D.C. 1963), aff’d per curiam, 342 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
125 See, e.g., In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (discussing “the President’s Article II prosecutorial discretion”); AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 429–30 (2012).
126 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 10, at 675–77.
127 Id. at 711–18.
128 Id. at 711–12; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be
passed.”).
129 421 U.S. 560, 562–63 (1975).
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to bring a civil suit against the union to set aside the election.”130 Lower
courts have continued avoiding the question,131 while at least one judge has
suggested an affirmative order to prosecute would be unconstitutional.132
Similarly, while the Supreme Court has recognized inherent judicial power to
punish contempt of court,133 its principal rationale for doing so—that inherent judicial authority is “essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means
to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on [the] other
[two] Branches”—presumes that any judicial request for executive prosecution would not be binding on the executive branch.134
At the same time, courts have exercised more indirect forms of review.
Although in dicta the Supreme Court has also called it “entirely clear that the
refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review,”135 in fact under
a federal procedural rule courts do review (albeit on limited grounds) dismissal of criminal charges once filed.136 In principle, moreover, the court may
present possible crimes to a grand jury itself, although courts rarely do so
today.137 Courts likewise must approve plea bargains, and accordingly may
sometimes reject them for being unduly lenient, in what is effectively a form
of review of the choice not to prosecute certain crimes or pursue certain
130 Id. at 575. The Court in Heckler described Dunlop as a case involving an express
provision for judicial review that rebuts the general presumption of non-reviewability for
nonenforcement decisions. See Heckler, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985).
131 See, e.g., Harrington v. Chao, 280 F.3d 50, 60–61 (1st Cir. 2002) (remanding administrative decision not to sue); Shelley v. Brock, 793 F.2d 1368, 1375–76 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(same); cf. Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to issue
injunctive relief but relying on assurances from Secretary that he would commence suit).
132 See Doyle, 821 F.2d at 788 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (“I very much doubt the constitutional propriety of an order directing the Secretary to file suit.” (citing Smith v. United
States, 375 F.2d 243, 246–48 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171–73
(5th Cir. 1965))).
133 See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795–96
(1987); see also generally Note, Permitting Private Initiation of Criminal Contempt Proceedings,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1487–89 (2011) (summarizing case law). This power is also recognized by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
134 Young, 481 U.S. at 796; see also id. at 801 (“If the Judiciary were completely dependent on the Executive Branch to redress direct affronts to its authority, it would be powerless to protect itself if that Branch declined prosecution.”).
135 ICC v. Bhd. Of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987).
136 FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); see also, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 30 (1977)
(deeming non-dismissal abuse of discretion only because the government’s request “was
motivated by considerations which cannot fairly be characterized as clearly contrary to
manifest public interest” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See note 197 below for
further discussion of applicable case law.
137 ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR GRAND JURORS 3 (“Matters may be
brought to its attention in three ways: (1) by the United States Attorney or an Assistant
United States Attorney; (2) by the court that impaneled it; and (3) from the personal
knowledge of a member of the grand jury or from matters properly brought to a member’s
personal attention.”). For discussion of early federal practice, see Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 10, at 732 & n.263.
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penalties.138 The defense of selective prosecution (despite its limited scope)
indirectly restricts nonenforcement by precluding some prosecutions following non-prosecution in other similar cases.139 Historically, at least, the common law and some state statutes provided remedies for failures of
enforcement in certain circumstances.140 By way of contrast, under settled
doctrine and practice, Presidents can issue pardons and other forms of clemency for any reason or no reason or even bad reasons.141 Although some
have attempted to derive criminal prosecutorial discretion from the pardon
power,142 courts have not extended the same degree of absolute freedom to
enforcement-related decisions. At the very least, even if criminal non-prose138 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; In re Morgan, 506 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 11 vests
district courts with considerable discretion to assess the wisdom of plea bargains.”).
139 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
140 See, e.g., South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 396, 402–03 (1855) (indicating that neglect of
public duty to preserve the public peace was punishable by indictment at common law);
Darlington v. Mayor of New York, 31 N.Y. 164, 187 (1865) (upholding statute indemnifying
property owners for damage caused by riot that public officials failed to prevent; see also
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768–69 (2005) (noting that the people of a
state may “create a system by which police departments are generally held financially
accountable for crimes that better policing might have prevented”)).
141 See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871) (“To the executive alone is
intrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.”); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
333, 380 (1866) (“The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated [for
impeachments]. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any
time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to
legislative control.”). But cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the
Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1346 (2008) (“[T]he clemency power has faced
increasing criticism for its inconsistency with the fundamental values of administrative
law.”). A majority of Justices in one case with no majority opinion suggested that state
clemency decisions must comport with due process, but the extent of review they contemplated appeared limited to situations where “a state official flipped a coin to determine
whether to grant clemency, or . . . the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its
clemency process.” Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 292
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142 Some have argued that nonenforcement is a lesser power necessarily implied by the
greater power to issue pardons. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 125, at 429. A pardon or
amnesty, however, has different requirements and effects from nonenforcement decisions.
Whereas an award of clemency irrevocably excuses a completed criminal offense, nonenforcement turns a blind eye to legal violations. Moreover, nonenforcement may apply prospectively insofar as the offenses in question are incomplete or ongoing. Such prospective
cancellation of legal requirements could arguably amount to a greater power than the
power to pardon, insofar as it may induce non-compliance rather than simply excusing
past violations. At any rate, the pardon power is limited to criminal rather than civil
offenses, and the specific textual grant of pardon power may well imply that even as to
criminal offenses clemency rather than nonenforcement is the proper means of exercising
leniency. For further discussion of differences between clemency and nonenforcement,
see Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 802, 849 (2015).
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cution approaches an absolute prerogative in practice, Dunlop, Heckler, and
other cases have rejected the prerogative’s extension to civil
nonenforcement.
In sum, even under idealized conditions of adequate resources and a
clear duty to enforce, the constitutional separation of powers imposes one
narrow but important limitation on judicial power: courts may not compel an
executive enforcement suit in any particular case. As a result, any executive
enforcement obligation in such cases, either as a result of a specific statutory
mandate or as a function of the more general requirement of faithful execution, presents a political question of the textually assigned variety. Law
enforcement thus parallels the approach the Supreme Court took in another
political question case with respect to the House of Representative’s exclusion of a member: courts may have power to declare another branch’s obligations, but not to compel their performance.143 In the enforcement context,
this admittedly awkward balance preserves legal accountability for clear
breaches of executive duty, but at the same time protects the most central,
irreducible aspect of the executive function from direct judicial control.144
Nevertheless, this limit does not readily translate to modern appellatestyle judicial review of administrative decisions, where the court’s function is
to ensure administrative adherence to legal requirements, not to referee
between the government and a private defendant. In such contexts, too, the
proper outcome of judicial review might normally be a remand rather than
an order of enforcement, so as to enable an exercise of administrative judgment subject to applicable requirements of administrative due process.145
143 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517–18 (1969) (avoiding the question whether
federal courts could “issue mandamus or injunctions compelling officers or employees of
the House to perform specific official acts” because declaratory relief could resolve case).
144 Cf. Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
701, 704 (“At bottom, the executive power is the power to execute the laws.”). Although I
do not further develop this proposal here, this remedial conception of political questions
may have broader application. For example, courts might hold authority to adjudge the
legality of a war by indirect means, but not to enjoin presidentially directed combat
directly. On one controversial account, court judgments are always essentially precatory
with respect to the executive branch because presidents hold independent authority to
decline to execute them. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994) (“[T]he executive’s power to
interpret the law may, and should, be exercised independently of the interpretations of
other branches, including those of the federal courts.”). For a more limited view, see, for
example, William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1809 (2008) (“[T]he judicial power vested in Article III courts allows them to render binding judgments that must
be enforced by the Executive Branch so long as those courts have jurisdiction over the
case.”).
145 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (“[T]he proper course,
except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation.”); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (“If the
record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged
agency action on the basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare cir-
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But the specific concern about collapsing executive and adjudicative functions under conventional separation of powers is absent. At the least, the
prohibition on compelled prosecution cannot justify Heckler’s refusal to
require even a reasoned basis for administrative nonenforcement decisions,
nor indeed can it explain courts’ broader reluctance to police enforcement
decisions by indirect means. Finally, it fails to preclude judicial scrutiny of
general enforcement policies whose reversal would not necessarily result in
enforcement in any particular case. Courts’ broader reluctance to intrude
on nonenforcement requires reference to the other prong of the political
question analysis, judicial unmanageability.
C. Real-World Enforcement: Judicial Unmanageability
In reality, as already noted, federal enforcement agencies rarely have
anywhere near adequate resources to fully enforce the laws they administer,
nor are they under any explicit mandate to do so.146 Congress in any case
legislates against a background assumption of at least case-specific enforcement discretion. Hence, even when Congress uses the mandatory term
“shall” (rather than “may”) with respect to a given prohibition, some executive discretion should be presumed.147 But whatever the extent of that baseline discretion under idealized conditions, it is greatly magnified in practice
by the resource constraints and practical challenges that generally preclude
anything approaching full enforcement. As one scholar puts it, “The problem of insufficient resources is an endemic feature of the modern federal
government.”148 This feature of modern law enforcement creates problems
of judicial manageability that powerfully supplement and reinforce any considerations of textual assignment that would otherwise justify a limited judicial role.
1. The Problem in General
In Heckler, the Supreme Court in fact emphasized unmanageability as a
rationale for interpreting the APA to limit judicial review. As a general matter, the Court observed that questions are “committed to agency discretion
by law”149 when “the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningcumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”);
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (affirming
remand nonenforcement decision but emphasizing that district court order required only
commencement of administrative proceedings subject to due process requirements).
146 See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
147 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 10, at 704; see also, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 835 (1985) (interpreting term “shall” in enforcement provision to preserve
discretion because such language is “commonly found in the criminal provisions of Title
18 of the United States Code”).
148 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Response, The Statutory Nonenforcement Power, 91 TEX.
L. REV. SEE ALSO 115, 118–19 (2013).
149 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
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ful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”150
The Court then elaborated on why nonenforcement decisions entail a similar
absence of “judicially manageable standards . . . for judging how and when an
agency should exercise its discretion.”151 The Court observed:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing
of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the
agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether
agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the
agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement
action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether
the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency
generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is
charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts
to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its
priorities.152

The Court has offered parallel justifications for limiting even constitutional
selective prosecution challenges:
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence
value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship
to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to
the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.153

These compressed statements highlight central practical problems with
judicial review, yet they also pointedly presume some enforcement responsibility on the part of the agency. Agencies cannot pursue every “technical
violation.” Nevertheless, the agency’s challenge is one of “ordering . . . priorities,” determining how resources are “best spent,” and assessing the likelihood of success and “general deterrence value” of a given set of cases, not
deciding whether the statute the agency “is charged with enforcing” is worth
implementing at all. The question these assertions beg is why judicial inquiry
into the availability of resources and their highest value application is so inappropriate, even if conducted deferentially. Why is it not “the kind of analysis
the courts are competent to undertake” to assess the agency’s reasons for not
acting and judge whether those reasons reflect an adequate effort to effectuate statutory policies? Placing the Court’s statements in the context of
broader ideas about judicial unmanageability suggests an answer.154
150 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830 (discussing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 410 (1971)).
151 Id. (discussing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410).
152 Id. at 831–32.
153 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–90 (1999) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985)).
154 As noted earlier, Heckler gave several additional rationales, beyond these “administrative” difficulties, for deeming nonenforcement unreviewable. In particular, it analogized administrative nonenforcement to a prosecutor’s refusal to press criminal charges,
indicated that nonenforcement is not “coercive” in character, and noted the absence of
any clear “focus for review” when the agency takes no action. 470 U.S. at 832. Most com-
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The central problem with judicial review of nonenforcement is that second-guessing executive choices under real-world conditions of restricted
resources, practical challenges, and presumed case-by-case discretion risks
engaging in unprincipled line-drawing of the sort courts more generally
describe as judicially unmanageable. Nonenforcement, in other words, is
judicially unmanageable because it is practically inevitable. Against a background of resource constraints and practical challenges, enforcing even the
most determinate legal requirement in practice becomes a task as indeterminate as interpreting the sort of open-ended statutory standard deemed
unmanageable in Armstrong; in both contexts, the court has “no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”155 To
draw a constitutional analogy, determining how little enforcement is too little, or how important a violation must be to be important enough for
enforcement, comes to resemble a judgment about how much delegation is
too much: courts cannot draw either line in unbiased fashion.156 Attempting
to do so with respect to nonenforcement, moreover, could compromise
courts’ long-term credibility and legitimacy by making judges, rather than
accountable executive officials, responsible for underenforcement in areas
that the public deems more worthy of attention. Courts thus may best leave
any necessary line-drawing to the political process.
Indeed, this problem of judicial unmanageability has at least three
dimensions. The first, perhaps most commonly invoked by commentators, is
that enforcement under conditions of resource scarcity becomes an essentially managerial problem.157 Enforcing in one case means not enforcing in
another. Without full visibility into an agency’s opportunities and challenges, courts cannot readily assess whether the agency made the right call in
failing to pursue a particular case or set of cases.158 Nor can courts gain
mentators have not found these rationales compelling on their own. The analogy of criminal prosecution to administrative nonenforcement is strained, for reasons addressed
earlier. See supra Section II.B. Emphasizing the non-coercive character of nonenforcement neglects the interests of regulatory beneficiaries who may be shortchanged by administrative inaction, and agencies would likely provide a record to enable “focus[ed]” review
of nonenforcement decisions if the Court interpreted the APA to provide for review in the
first place. For critique of these rationales in Heckler, see for example Biber, Judicial Review,
supra note 16, at 486–88, and supra note 35.
155 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830.
156 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
157 See, e.g., Magill, supra note 20, at 1421–22 & n.131 (characterizing nonenforcement
as involving a “polycentric” problem on which courts have limited perspective); Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies Defer Decisions, 103 GEO.
L.J. 157, 170–71 (2014) (noting “agencies must necessarily set priorities among possible
actions, based on a myriad of imponderable factors that courts are ill-suited to assess”).
158 Fleszar v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 598 F.3d 912, 914–15 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Judges do not
know what is on the agency’s menu and so cannot displace the agency’s choices among
projects.”); Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Courts
cannot intelligently supervise the Commission’s allocation of its staff’s time, because
although judges see clearly the claim the Commission has declined to redress, they do not
see at all the tasks the staff may accomplish with the time released. . . . Judges compare the
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comprehensive perspective on agency activities without intruding on basic
aspects of the agency’s administration. From this point of view, courts’ reluctance to question nonenforcement is consistent with other decisions limiting
judicial intrusion on agencies’ allocation of resources and other “programmatic” aspects of administration.159
A second, related problem is that, much like some other questions
deemed judicially unmanageable, nonenforcement decisions often turn on
“empirical findings or predictive judgments for which [courts] lack competence” and that “another institution [here, the executive branch] is both better situated and constitutionally obliged to make.”160 In fact, just
ascertaining what enforcement focus the agency has adopted may be difficult
if the agency has made no public announcement.161 Compounding the
problem, secrecy is often essential to faithful execution of a statutory policy
that cannot be fully enforced. Whereas public disclosure of enforcement
practices may enable evasion, secrecy keeps regulated parties guessing,
potentially enabling the agency to obtain maximum compliance.162 For this
reason, courts have resisted both discovery and Freedom of Information Act
requests for internal enforcement guidelines.163
Even if the agency’s approach is ascertainable in the first place, determining its efficacy presents further problems. Assessing what resources the
agency has available may be difficult; determining what can realistically be
case at hand against a rule of law or an abstract standard of diligence and do not see the
opportunity costs of reallocations within the agency.”).
159 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (“[R]espondent
cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the
offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are
normally made.” (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990))); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (deeming allocation of funds within lump-sum
appropriation unreviewable).
160 Fallon, supra note 96, at 1291 (citing Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309
(2nd Cir. 1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1157 (2d Cir. 1973); Crockett v. Reagan,
558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982)).
161 See, e.g., PETA v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding nothing to review in challenge to agency’s alleged failure to enforce statutory prohibition on
bird abuse because agency had made no official pronouncement), aff’d on other grounds,
797 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
162 For my own elaboration of this point, see Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, supra note
17, at 1138.
163 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012) (exempting agency documents from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act where production “would disclose guidelines for
law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be
expected to risk circumvention of the law”); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465
(1996) (observing with respect to selective-prosecution challenge that judicial review of a
prosecution’s basis “may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy” (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985));
Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (observing with respect to
Freedom of Information Act provision that “the importance of deterrence explains why
the exemption is written in broad and general terms”).
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accomplished with those resources even more so.164 What is more, a faithful
agency devoted to accomplishing a statute’s policy goals must often decide
what balance between forbearance and severity is best calculated to effectuate long-run compliance by regulated parties. In principle, all these aspects
of enforcement strategy are matters of expertise and judgment in light of
experience; they are not matters of law-like determination on which judges
with different policy predilections can be expected to reach convergent conclusions. Accordingly, they present precisely the sort of difficulty that has led
courts in other contexts to leave the matter to political judgment and
accountability rather than judicial elaboration of legal standards.
These first two problems might nevertheless be surmountable if courts
confronted a clear enough violation of faithful execution; courts, after all,
have mandated extensive institutional reforms in other contexts.165 Yet a
third difficulty, also suggested in Heckler,166 reinforces the first two: when
Congress adopts laws (either directly or by delegation) while limiting
enforcement resources, its intent as to proper agency focus—as opposed to
overall policy—is fundamentally indeterminate. In taking affirmative action,
some “intelligible principle” articulated in the statute guides the agency’s
action, providing the basic goal the agency should aim to achieve.167 When
selecting enforcement priorities, agencies should likewise aim to achieve
overall statutory objectives, yet statutes rarely provide explicit guidance as to
what the agency should do, or even what it should do first, when it cannot do
everything.168
In particular, prohibitory statutes and regulations typically provide only
primary rules of conduct, not secondary rules regarding which primary viola164 Agencies do present such evidence in some contexts, such as in suits challenging
delays in rulemaking based on resource scarcity, but courts generally give great deference
to agency claims of resource incapacity. See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, 751 F.3d
649, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“EPA submitted evidence of its budgetary and staff constraints[ ] [and] explained that it has 45 mandatory rulemakings in progress or under
review . . . .”); see also infra note 221–22 and accompanying text.
165 See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1295–96 (1976) (discussing rise of so-called structural reform litigation). But cf.
Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the
Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1389–99 (2000) (discussing decline of
such litigation).
166 470 U.S. at 835–36.
167 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (discussing the constitutional requirement of an “intelligible principle” to guide exercises of authority delegated
by Congress).
168 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (describing Heckler as holding that
“[s]ince the statute conferring power on the Food and Drug Administration to prohibit the
unlawful misbranding or misuse of drugs provided no substantive standards on which a
court could base its review, we found that enforcement actions were committed to the
complete discretion of the FDA to decide when and how they should be pursued”). For
general discussion of this issue, see Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 157, at 178–81.
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tions deserve emphasis.169 Nor can such secondary rules generally be
inferred, in any determinate law-like fashion, from a statute that fails to provide explicitly for them.170 As the Court put it in Heckler, substantive prohibitions, without more, are “simply irrelevant to the agency’s discretion to refuse
to initiate proceedings.”171 Absent more specific statutory direction, narcotics enforcement might focus on supply or demand; environmental enforcement might focus on widespread small violations or isolated big-impact
offenses; tax enforcement might focus on the largest underpayments, the
most readily provable violations, or perhaps on maintaining overall levels of
compliance through relatively random auditing.172 One or the other focus
might be more humane, or more sensible, or more genuinely calculated to
bring about overall compliance with the law. But insofar as resource constraints preclude full enforcement and a statute or implementing regulation
renders all the conduct in question unlawful, it may be difficult to say that
the substantive law itself dictates any particular choice of priority.173
Further parsing of the statutes may only yield contradictory inferences.
To use a current example, provisions in the immigration code allowing
adjustment of status based on family relationships might suggest congressional support for an enforcement policy focused on family unity, or it might
suggest that those specific means of relief, and not enforcement discretion,
should advance that particular objective.174 Specific crimes addressing nar169 Agencies do sometimes adopt regulations imposing procedural requirements and
standards on enforcement efforts. For discussion of this case law, see infra note 272.
170 For discussion of this point in the context of immigration law, see Cox & Rodriguez,
supra note 63, at 151 (“In a world where nearly half of all noncitizens living in the United
States are formally deportable, there can be no meaningful search for the congressionally
preferred screening criteria.”).
171 470 U.S. at 835–36.
172 Congress does, of course, sometimes impose general constraints on enforcement
priorities. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-76, div. F., tit. II, 128 Stat. 5, 251 (directing DHS to “prioritize the identification and
removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime”); Cox & Rodriguez,
supra note 63, at 151–53 (discussing other examples). My point is that in the absence of
congressional direction the statute generally cannot be understood to provide judicially
manageable standards for reviewing agency priorities. Even when Congress does provide
such directions, courts would likely still lack manageable standards unless the agency
openly defied the congressional directive or the legislation provided guidance specifically
applicable to particular cases.
173 For a recent application of this principle, see Speed Mining, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety
& Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2008) (declining to review enforcement decision for consistency with the “purposes and policies” of the statute because doing
so would “render the principles of nonreviewability [established by Heckler] null and
void”). See also Sec’y of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(rejecting “purposes and policies” standard for review because “it invites the reviewing
body to substitute its views of enforcement policy for those of the Secretary”).
174 See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 152–53 (elaborating this argument). Cox
and Rodriguez’s use of this argument to support DACA and DAPA is not necessarily persuasive, insofar as those programs require more affirmative legal authority than organic
agency enforcement discretion. See infra text accompanying notes 291–97.
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cotics-related violence might suggest a priority for preventing violence overall
in narcotics enforcement, or might suggest that enforcement of plain-vanilla
narcotics violations should not be thus targeted. Even the grading of penalties might suggest either that offenses with the highest penalties are most
significant, or only that such penalties are merited insofar as the violation in
question is otherwise worth pursuing. Courts normally give great deference
to administrative agencies’ resource-allocation judgments.175 Against a backdrop of presumed agency enforcement discretion, judicial efforts to extract
an ordering of priorities from a statute that fails to provide for them would
intrude directly on such choices.
Enforcement discretion’s prevalence may even produce a troubling
divergence between formal legal requirements and actual public preferences.
Despite the general presumption that Congress intends laws it adopts to be
faithfully executed, entrenched enforcement discretion may permit Congress
to pass, or at least fail to repeal, laws that lack genuine public support. That
is to say, once widespread nonenforcement becomes practically inevitable,
Congress may enact laws with the expectation that they will not be fully
enforced; and by the same token, it may choose not to devote legislative
effort to narrowing or repealing existing laws that would be deeply unpopular if fully enforced, precisely because those laws’ nonenforcement reduces
the urgency to update them.176 Polarized politics and legislative incapacity
exacerbate these problems.177 Political minorities who favor existing laws
may employ the legislative process’s multiple veto-gates to stymie legal
change, even if those laws are deeply unpopular with overall majorities and
would be politically intolerable if fully enforced.178
At the least, this distressing paradigm appears to capture the current
politics of immigration. Over time, Congress has enacted a harsh and restrictive immigration code that formally requires removal of undocumented
immigrants but is effectively unenforceable, at least with available resources.
But despite substantial majorities favoring reform, political minorities have
blocked legislative change.179 Immigration law may be an extreme example,
175 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“As we have repeated time
and again, an agency has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited
resources and personnel to carry out its designated responsibilities.”); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2014) (observing that “[a]gencies have many
responsibilities, and limited resources” and “[i]t is rare that agencies lack discretion to
choose their own enforcement priorities”).
176 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
546–49 (2001) (discussing this risk in the context of criminal law).
177 On partisan polarization in general, see Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not
Hold: the Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 275 (2011)
(“American democracy over the last generation has had one defining attribute: the rise of
extreme partisan polarization.”).
178 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441, 1444–49 (2008) (describing multiple “vetogates” that impede legislation).
179 See Mark Murray, NBC/WSJ Poll: Nearly Half Oppose Executive Action on Immigration,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-reform/
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but public choice theory suggests the problem may be more general. Congress has incentives to curry favor with broad electoral interests by passing
aspirational statutes, while at the same time leaving to executive agencies the
hard tradeoffs about which focused interests to target in actual regulation
and enforcement.180 Certainly, at least until recently, the political preferences of a tough-on-crime electorate, coupled with prosecutors’ discretion to
avoid politically costly applications of overbroad prohibitions, drove steady
expansion of federal criminal law.181
The force of these concerns about ambiguous congressional intent and
slippage from public preferences likely varies by context, but their potential
applicability provides important context for courts’ resistance to secondguessing executive nonenforcement. The practical inevitability of enforcement discretion in many regulatory contexts makes assessing the choices
agencies have made judicially unmanageable by conventional criteria. As in
other contexts involving questions deemed unmanageable, courts could
develop doctrinal benchmarks for faithful enforcement. But doing so would
quickly lead courts into a thicket of hard tradeoffs and fuzzy factual determinations, ultimately requiring a statutorily ungoverned determination of
which violations are most important. Courts rightly judge that line-drawing
of this sort is better left to the political process. That is particularly true
insofar as enforcement discretion may itself open up gaps between substantive laws and public preferences. Were they to question executive nonenforcement too sharply, courts would risk compromising their own legitimacy
by taking Congress’s laws more seriously than Congress has itself.
2. Case-Specific Nonenforcement
These manageability problems apply with particular force to case-specific nonenforcement decisions, as opposed to announced general policies.182 Although Heckler itself was ambiguous about the meaning of
nonenforcement and the scope of decisions subject to its unreviewability presumption, some lower courts have understood the decision to apply only to
case-specific—“single shot”—nonenforcement, as opposed to general agency
policies.183 Even some courts articulating this distinction have not applied it
nbcwsj-poll-nearly-half-oppose-executive-action-immigration-n251631 (reporting poll finding that “a majority of Americans (57 percent) favor[ ] a pathway to citizenship for
undocumented immigrants” and that such support “increases to 74 percent when respondents are told that such a pathway requires paying fines and back taxes, as well as passing a
security background check”).
180 See Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 16, at 40–48 (discussing public choice theory literature).
181 See Stuntz, supra note 176, at 546–49. For discussion of possible shifting politics in
favor of decreased severity, see HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME (2015).
182 See infra subsection II.C.3 for discussion of general policies.
183 See, e.g., Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Chaney applies to
individual, case-by-case determinations of when to enforce existing regulations rather than
permanent policies or standards.”); Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671,
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consistently.184 Furthermore, although Heckler itself was a “single shot” decision in the sense that it involved denial of a specific petition for enforcement,
the petition related to a general class of cases and the agency’s decision
announced a general approach of nonenforcement with respect to that
class.185 All that said, the basic insight that Heckler carries greatest force with
respect to “single shot” nonenforcement is sound.186
Confronted with nonenforcement in a particular case, courts cannot
readily judge the agency’s opportunity costs in pursuing that case rather than
another. Indeed, even the agency may not be aware of the full set of potentially comparable cases that could be developed with adequate investigation.
Courts likewise cannot assess the agency’s likelihood of success as competently as the agency can; nor can they objectively judge the relative importance of the case within the agency’s overall responsibilities.
Some critics of Heckler have argued that arbitrariness review of the sort
courts normally perform with respect to discretionary agency action should
nevertheless apply equally to administrative nonenforcement.187 On this
view, at least insofar as the agency has memorialized its nonenforcement
decision in some form (such as through denial of a petition for enforcement), a court conducting judicial review under the APA could set aside the
agency’s decision if the agency failed adequately to consider its decision’s
implications, made some evident mistake in its perception of the facts or law,
or appeared to rely on arbitrary or impermissible reasons rather than reasons
rooted in statutory or regulatory policy.188 While this proposal in principle
might help ensure consistency and fairness in agency enforcement practices,
it carries at least two fatal drawbacks.
The first is that requiring a decisionmaking process sufficient to support
such review would itself squander enforcement resources while achieving little commensurate benefit in terms of statutory compliance. As Eric Biber has
676–77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that general policies are reviewable but “single-shot”
nonenforcement decisions are not).
184 See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(deeming general policy unreviewable); cf. California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1091
(9th Cir. 1997).
185 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
186 The Supreme Court indeed stated in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007),
that agency resource-allocation discretion is “at its height when the agency decides not to
bring an enforcement action.” The Court, however, did not specifically address general
nonenforcement policies, but rather distinguished case-specific nonenforcement from failure to initiate rulemaking. Id. at 527–28.
187 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 158; Bressman, supra note 15, at 1690–91. This
argument traces a lineage to Kenneth Culp Davis’s argument in Discretionary Justice that
administrative prosecutorial decisionmaking should be bound by rules to the maximum
degree possible. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 55 (1969). For an account
placing Davis’s argument within contemporary intellectual currents and the broader trajectory of Davis’s work, see Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative
Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1414
(2000).
188 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 15, at 1690–91.
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argued, agencies typically “must make many informal and quick judgments
on a regular basis” about “whether to enforce a regulation or statute against a
private party.”189 “In such situations, the possibility of judicial review would
force the agency to make those decisions in a more formal and regularized
manner, require a vast increase in resources for the decisionmaking process,
and sharply circumscribe its ability to address other issues or problems.”190
In contrast, the principal asserted benefit of judicial review would be to mitigate risks of corruption, improper bias, or legal error.191 But absent any particular reason to suspect such improper motivations, the benefits of reducing
this risk may not be worth the costs in terms of reducing administrative efficiency and overall enforcement potential.192
At any rate, these proposals carry the additional problem that requiring
reasoned elaboration of agency enforcement practice could itself be counterproductive with respect to the ultimate goal of faithful execution—ensuring
compliance with substantive law. An articulated enforcement practice is one
that regulated parties can evade. For this reason, agencies often keep
enforcement priorities secret or even avoid articulating them formally.193 To
be sure, there may also be benefits to announcing an agency’s priorities; I
address the benefits and costs of doing so below.194 But interpreting the
APA to require such reason-giving across the board would unduly collapse
the distinction between law and its enforcement. Advocates of this view,
indeed, recognize that it would require articulation of general enforcement
policies independent of substantive legal requirements; insofar as the substantive law itself fails to prescribe any focus of agency effort, the agency
would need to articulate such priorities itself and then justify each enforcement proceeding in their terms.195 But to the extent such policies bind the
agency (either practically or legally), they may effectively replace applicable
substantive law as the governing law for regulated parties.196
189 Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 16, at 35.
190 Id.
191 See Bressman, supra note 15, at 1690–91 (arguing for arbitrariness review on these
grounds).
192 See Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 16, at 35 (noting this concern); cf. Bressman, supra note 15, at 1693–04 (acknowledging “considerable costs, both in terms of
administrative flexibility and administrative efficiency,” in requiring probing arbitrariness
review of nonenforcement decisions).
193 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012) (exempting from required disclosure agency documents whose production “would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the
law”); Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining this
provision in terms of “the importance of deterrence”).
194 See infra text accompanying notes 208–09.
195 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 15, at 1690–93 (proposing to require agency “standard-setting” so that particular enforcement decisions could be judged against pre-established standards); Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 182–83 (similar).
196 Proponents of this view often focus on contexts in which the agency has broad effective lawmaking authority and the regulatory context makes it likely that regulated parties
(but perhaps not regulatory beneficiaries) will detect the agency’s unstated enforcement
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For all these reasons, interpreting the APA to categorically bar review of
such decisions comports with more general, constitutionally informed ideas
about the relative institutional competence of courts and executive agencies—whether or not the effective freedom given to executive officials by this
judicial passivity accords with any appropriate conception of how executive
officials should independently understand their responsibility. As Heckler recognizes, if Congress specifically provides for review or imposes a specific mandate of enforcement, then the problem of judicial unmanageability
disappears. The court then need not consider the imponderable tradeoffs
involved in not proceeding in the particular case; Congress has effectively
established an enforcement priority for the agency, and the court need only
review the agency’s decision in the particular case. But without such congressional direction the court would have no objective basis for requiring
enforcement in the particular case.197
patterns even if the agency articulates no public enforcement policy. See, e.g., Bhagwat,
supra note 15, at 175–76 (suggesting that in heavily regulated industries enforcement patterns may become apparent to regulated parties even without any formal statement of
policy). The proposals to regularize agency enforcement discretion may well carry greatest
force in that context, but these concerns cannot necessarily be generalized to other contexts where substantive statutes are more specific or regulated parties less attuned to
agency choices.
197 Federal courts’ approach to the procedural rule on criminal charge dismissals provides an instructive comparison to Heckler’s interpretation of the APA. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 48 requires judicial approval for any dismissal of criminal charges. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) (“The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment,
information, or complaint. The government may not dismiss the prosecution during trial
without the defendant’s consent.”). When the Supreme Court adopted this rule in 1944, it
apparently aimed to conform federal procedure to state reforms requiring judicial
approval of charge dismissals. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 510–11 (5th Cir.
1975) (describing history of federal rule). Those state reforms, in turn, apparently aimed
to limit perceived prosecutorial laxity by preventing discretionary charge dismissals. See
ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 14, 17–18 (1981).
If federal criminal law were more uniformly enforced, and prosecutorial discretion
less central to federal criminal justice, reviewing the government’s reasons for charge dismissals in this way might have helped ensure equity among defendants and more complete
enforcement of applicable laws. But against the backdrop of extensive nonenforcement,
including many crimes that are never charged at all, courts have no manageable standard
against which to assess prosecutorial choices, and requiring reason-giving in the limited
context of charge dismissals would do little to enforce equity among defendants. It too,
moreover, could be counter-productive from the standpoint of deterrence if it forced the
government to reveal undisclosed priorities. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
465 (1996) (limiting discovery to prove selective prosecution in part because of concerns
about impairing “prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement
policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts have thus effectively limited the rule
to contexts in which prosecutors appear likely to proceed in any event, but in an abusive or
harassing fashion. See, e.g., In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 452–53 (7th Cir. 2003) (indicating that the rule’s “purpose, at least the principal purpose, is to protect a defendant
from the government’s harassing him by repeatedly filing charges and then dismissing
them before they are adjudicated”); In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2000)
(describing the “rarest of cases” in which “refusal to dismiss is appropriate”); United States
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3. General Policies
Concerns about judicial unmanageability apply somewhat differently to
publicly disclosed general nonenforcement policies. To begin with, insofar
as it alerts regulated parties to agency enforcement plans, any such policy
carries costs in terms of statutory compliance that more ad hoc or indefinite
or undisclosed nonenforcement practices do not. Articulating a general policy thus moves one step beyond the inevitable enforcement discretion that
results from resource constraints and practical challenges. To be sure, the
agency might well have achieved the same pattern of results through case-bycase nonenforcement without articulation of a general policy. In principle,
moreover, the agency might always change its policy without notice and
resume enforcement.198 Even so, insofar as the policy provides advance
notice of the agency’s intentions, it may carry costs to compliance with substantive law that nonenforcement in any particular case does not. By the
same token, setting aside the policy through judicial review might vindicate
the primacy of the substantive law simply by restoring that law’s deterrent
effect, even if the agency never ultimately pursues enforcement in any particular case. Furthermore, the very choice to articulate the policy provides an
opportunity for deliberation and explanation, thus enabling more probing
judicial scrutiny of agency reasoning without triggering concerns about
diverting agency resources or forcing an articulation of undisclosed internal
priorities.199
Nevertheless, for the same reasons that review of single-shot nonenforcement decisions is generally unmanageable, any substantive review of a policy
that merely sets resource-allocation priorities should be highly deferential.200
If the policy is expressly predicated on legal interpretation, courts should
assess the interpretation’s validity, as indeed they have done in some decisions.201 Legal error in single-shot decisions may be tolerable given the low
v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1463 (10th Cir.1985) (identifying “prosecutorial harassment”
or a threat to “the fair administration of criminal justice and the need to preserve the
integrity of the courts” as the sole grounds for refusing dismissal).
198 See Seidenfeld, supra note 53, at 340–42, 376 (discussing these features of guidance
documents in general).
199 Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[A]n
agency will generally present a clearer (and more easily reviewable) statement of its reasons for acting when formally articulating a broadly applicable enforcement policy,
whereas such statements in the context of individual decisions to forego enforcement tend
to be cursory, ad hoc, or post hoc.”).
200 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“As we have repeated time and
again, an agency has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources
and personnel to carry out its designated responsibilities.”). The intensity of arbitrariness
review is generally “context-dependent.” Magill, supra note 20, at 1414; cf. Seidenfeld,
supra note 53, at 385 (noting that “courts hesitate to demand meaningful reasoned decisionmaking when an agency adopts a rule without developing a public record”).
201 See, e.g., Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e do not
believe the Court in Chaney intended its definition of ‘enforcement action’ to include an
interpretation by an agency that the statute’s goals could be met by adopting a certain
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costs to statutory compliance and high costs to formalizing such decisionmaking.202 But these costs and benefits reverse when an agency has formalized a
mistaken interpretation in an otherwise reviewable general policy; and no
problem of judicial unmanageability preludes assessing an express legal
interpretation (subject to any applicable degree of deference).203 Relatedly,
the policy may properly be subject to judicial review on procedural grounds if
the agency should have used notice-and-comment procedures. Under the
APA, as currently interpreted, such procedures are required for “legislative
rules,” that is, rules that create “legally binding obligations or prohibitions,”204 but not “general statements of policy,” including enforcement policies.205 While case law drawing this distinction is notoriously confused and
imprecise, courts have generally sought to detect when agencies have made
an effectively binding determination of law without using the more participatory and deliberative procedures the APA requires for such acts of
lawmaking.206
Yet if a policy surmounts these hurdles—if it is procedurally valid, does
not involve explicit interpretation, and comports with any explicit statutory
directives—courts should rarely look past a facially reasonable articulation of
how the policy will advance the agency’s statutory mission given resource limitations and practical constraints. Requiring some articulation of the policy’s
consistency with overall statutory or regulatory objectives may impose a useful
discipline and help ensure public accountability for the agency’s choices.207
permanent standard”); OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 808, 812 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (reviewing agency statutory interpretation underlying policy despite agency’s invocation of Heckler); Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc., 37 F.3d at 677 (“As general statements,
[enforcement policies] are more likely to be direct interpretations of the commands of the
substantive statute rather than the sort of mingled assessments of fact, policy, and law that
drive an individual enforcement decision and that are, as Chaney recognizes, peculiarly
within the agency’s expertise and discretion.”); Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 332
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (reviewing policy despite Heckler because policy interpreted “the substantive requirements of the law” and was “not the type of discretionary judgment concerning
the allocation of enforcement resources that Heckler shields from judicial review”).
202 See Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc., 37 F.3d at 675–76 (declining to review legal reasoning underlying agency nonenforcement decision (citing ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987))).
203 See Biber, Resource Allocation, supra note 16, at 31–33.
204 Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
205 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012) (also excluding from notice and comment “interpretative rules” and “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice”); see also generally
Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 758 F.3d at 250–52 (discussing distinctions).
206 For one recent summary of the case law, see Jill E. Family, Administrative Law
Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 571–78 (2012).
207 For a recent example of such generic articulation of consistency with statutory
objectives, see WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, 751 F.3d 649, 655–56 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding denial of rulemaking petition because “EPA’s decision to focus on more significant
sources of air pollutants before addressing coal mines is consistent with the statutory objective of reducing hazardous emissions overall” and “EPA has submitted evidence of its budgetary and staff constraints, explained that it has 45 mandatory rule rulemakings in progress
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But more probing scrutiny could quickly involve the court in unmanageable
judgments of relative importance, just as much as reviewing individual nonenforcement decisions would. After all, the policy only does overtly and formally what the agency must in any event do privately and informally. And
while public articulation of the agency’s priorities may carry costs to statutory
compliance, it may also carry countervailing benefits. For one thing, it may
facilitate managerial control of low-level enforcement decisions within the
agency.208 In addition, insofar as it alerts regulatory beneficiaries to agency
practice and provides a focus for opposition, the policy may even facilitate
pressure on the agency to redirect its efforts.209 Weighing these benefits and
costs is likely itself a judicially unmanageable inquiry and thus a matter properly “committed to agency discretion by law” under Heckler’s interpretation.
Accordingly, to be concrete, were the current marijuana nonenforcement policy otherwise reviewable,210 courts would have no manageable standard against which to assess the government’s choice of priorities. The
policy is expressly framed in terms of resource allocation, it emphasizes the
policy’s value in concentrating resources on crimes judged to be more significant (and more in accordance with traditional federal enforcement priorities), and it avoids any definite promise of future nonenforcement; it simply
states the government’s current judgment that marijuana offenses are not
presently the most important to pursue.211 Although I have elsewhere given
it an uneasy defense on the merits,212 the policy’s unusually public character
and dramatic real-world effects on compliance may raise concerns about its
legitimacy as a matter of faithful execution.213 The key point here is that
such concerns are not judicially manageable; they should be left to political
accountability and conscience. By the same token, current immigration
enforcement priorities (applicable quite apart from the DACA and DAPA
programs) merely focus enforcement efforts for the time being on cases the
or under review, and concluded that, in light of these constraints, the best course of action
is to prioritize sectors that emit more air pollutants”).
208 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836,
1911, 1929 (2015).
209 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 420–33 (2007) (discussing importance of agency guidance documents to regulatory beneficiaries).
210 Any direct challenge would present standing difficulties under current doctrine, see
supra text accompanying notes 46–52, but a number of courts have adjudicated cases
involving claimed reliance on the policies, see, e.g., United States v. Washington, 887 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1098 (D. Mont. 2012) (rejecting criminal defendant’s claimed reliance on
marijuana nonenforcement policy). Courts have reviewed criminal enforcement policies
under the APA when the party raising them had standing to do so. See, e.g., Roane v.
Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216, 227 (D.D.C. 2009) (deeming reviewable despite Heckler a
general policy with respect to enforcement of federal narcotics statutes against federal
lethal injections).
211 2013 Cole Memorandum, supra note 65, at 1–2 (stressing that marijuana remains
illegal but listing priorities that will guide enforcement).
212 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 10, at 757–59.
213 See infra Section III.A for further discussion of this point.
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executive branch judges to be most important.214 As OLC explained, the
priorities accord with the limited general guidance Congress has provided
with respect to enforcement,215 plausibly identify the most important cases
for emphasis given severely limited resources, and once again avoid any definite assurance of nonenforcement to any particular immigrants outside the
priority categories.216 While some again might question whether the priorities are correct, or whether they reflect the best effort at enforcement the
government could undertake, these questions are not judicially manageable
by conventional criteria.
In more technical areas—determining what levels of food impurity
should trigger enforcement, for example217—judicial review to ensure reasoned consideration of relevant scientific information and stakeholder interests may be more manageable.218 But in many cases that is so because the
policy effectively interprets an indefinite background legal standard—and
does so in a way that, absent direct review of the policy itself, will never come
before courts for judicial review in the context of a concrete enforcement
action.219 Even in such contexts, insofar as the agency’s policy ultimately
reduces to a judgment that conduct is unlawful but nonetheless low priority,
courts should review that determination of relative importance with great
deference to the agency’s more politically accountable judgments.220 In the
related, but arguably more consequential, context of agency denials of
rulemaking petitions, recent decisions have given wide deference to stated
justifications rooted plausibly in resource constraints and overall statutory
objectives, so long as Congress provided no specific deadline for the agency’s

214 See OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 7–11.
215 Id.; see also supra note 172 (discussing statutory directives).
216 OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 7–11.
217 See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (deeming
putative policy with this character a substantive rule).
218 For a general proposal to rely on substantive rather than procedural review of
enforcement policies and other guidance documents, see Seidenfeld, supra note 53.
219 Cf. Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“As
general statements, [enforcement policies] are more likely to be direct interpretations of
the commands of the substantive statute rather than the sort of mingled assessments of
fact, policy, and law that drive an individual enforcement decision and that are, as Chaney
recognizes, peculiarly within the agency’s expertise and discretion.”).
220 Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 185 (arguing that reviewing courts should “modulate
[their] level of scrutiny” depending on whether an enforcement policy depends on statutory interpretation or substantive policy, as opposed to resource-allocation and
prioritization).
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action.221 By analogy, much the same degree of deference should apply to
general enforcement priorities.222
Some have argued, to the contrary, that courts should probe beyond the
face of policies to ensure they were adopted in a good-faith effort to advance
statutory objectives.223 On this view, the executive branch faithfully executes
statutes when it genuinely tries to effectuate them; in contrast, it violates its
take-care obligation when it deliberately underenforces laws it dislikes for
policy reasons. In principle, this view of faithful execution is correct: the
Take Care Clause obligates the executive branch to enforce the law as it is
and not as executive officials wish it to be.224 Nevertheless, framing the judicial inquiry in overtly subjective terms would compound problems of judicial
unmanageability rather than alleviate them.
In other contexts the Supreme Court has sought to base decisions on
objective features of laws rather than political labels.225 Likewise, in formulating the political question doctrine more generally, the Court has indicated
that judicial abstention may be warranted based on “the impossibility of a
221 See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, 751 F.3d 649, 655–56 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(upholding denial of rulemaking petition based on plausible, demonstrated resource-allocation justification for focusing on other regulatory objectives). The Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Massachusetts v. EPA might be understood to permit more probing review
of such decisions. For reasons to doubt that interpretation, see Sunstein & Vermeule,
supra note 157, at 175.
222 In fact, lower courts have generally given great deference to such priority-setting
policies when they have reviewed them on the merits. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.
v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2014) (observing that “[a]gencies have many responsibilities, and limited resources” and “[i]t is rare that agencies lack discretion to choose
their own enforcement priorities”); Nat’l Roofing Contractors Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
639 F.3d 339, 341–44 (7th Cir. 2011) (treating conflicting non-binding enforcement policies with respect to workplace safety standard as decisions “belong[ing] to the Secretary,
not to the court”); Jones v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 983 F. Supp. 197,
204 (D.D.C. 1997) (applying “deferential” standard of review to claim that agency inadequately enforced antidiscrimination laws against banks). But cf. Chiang v. Kempthorne,
503 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352–53 (D.D.C. 2007) (reviewing policy despite Heckler and deeming
it arbitrary and capricious because it conflicted with a statutory directive and failed to
include discussion of “obvious competing concerns” relevant to the policy).
223 See, e.g., Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the
Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 230–32 (2015).
224 See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Agencies ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ by doing the best they can with the
resources Congress allows them.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) (citation omitted));
OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 6 (“[T]he Executive cannot, under the guise
of exercising enforcement discretion, attempt to effectively rewrite the laws to match its
policy preferences.”); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 212 (1992) (noting the President’s responsibility
to “enforce the law as it has been enacted, rather than as he would have wished it to be”).
225 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597 (2012) (upholding “penalty” as valid exercise of congressional taxing power and rejecting argument that
“even if the Constitution permits Congress to do exactly what we interpret this statute to
do, the law must be struck down because Congress used the wrong labels”).
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court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government.”226 Here, too, courts
should indulge a strong presumption that executive officials have acted in
good faith—as in fact the Court did in Heckler by presuming executive officials were focused on how agency resources are “best spent” and whether the
agency is likely to prevail in enforcement proceedings.227 Courts, moreover,
should recognize that executive officials may have legitimate reasons to take
different positions in different contexts.228 They might take a narrow view of
their authority when advocating legislative reform, for example, but reconsider that view after legislative initiatives have failed. Relying on such political statements by senior officials to show bad faith, as one court did in
assessing current immigration programs,229 is at the very least a breach of
inter-branch etiquette that risks compromising courts’ own political neutrality. If courts lack objective reasons for deeming enforcement policies legally
insufficient, they should leave the matter to the political process.
Heckler itself did recognize one important outer limit on nonenforcement policies. Despite deeming nonenforcement unreviewable as a general
matter, the Court reserved consideration of “a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has ‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities.”230 Heckler’s abdication backstop is itself an important indication that enforcement discretion is not plenary. Agencies must enforce the
laws they administer; they cannot sit on their hands simply because they find
those laws objectionable. Yet lower courts have rarely found violations of the
226 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
227 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Antidiscrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471, 489–90 (1999) (presuming executive officials were focused on assessing a
prosecution’s “general deterrence value” and “relationship to the Government’s overall
enforcement plan” (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985))). It is
true that in the related context of assessing whether an agency has “unreasonably delayed”
taking action in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), some courts have considered “bad
faith” as one factor among others in assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s action.
See, e.g., Indep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 1997); Telecomms.
Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Islam v.
Heinauer, 32 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2014). But they generally have not
engaged in an untethered subjective inquiry; they have instead looked for more concrete
indications of bad faith, such as “singling someone out for bad treatment or asserting utter
indifference to a congressional deadline.” Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 510 (quoting In re Barr
Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
228 Cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183,
1232–34 (2012) (arguing that, when executive officials defend in court laws that the
administration disapproves of as a matter of policy, “judges must provide adequate latitude
to permit a vigorous defense to take place without requiring the administration to misrepresent its own views about the wisdom or desirability of the statutory policy”).
229 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 667–68 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (relying in part
on presidential announcements regarding policy) aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016).
230 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
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abdication standard,231 and the difficulties applying it again relate to the
general problem of nonenforcement’s judicial unmanageability, rather than
any notion that it exhausts a proper conception of executive responsibility.
The essential problem with abdication is that instead of eliminating the
unmanageable line-drawing problem, the abdication standard simply pushes
the line further down. How much abdication amounts to Heckler-prohibited
abdication? If an agency has limited resources and multiple laws to enforce,
it necessarily must prioritize enforcement of some laws over others. Yet this
reality creates insuperable level-of-generality problems in assessing abdication. If the agency brings no enforcement actions under one statute or provision but nonetheless prosecutes other violations vigorously, has it abdicated
its responsibility under the first statute? Or has it instead faithfully executed
its statutory responsibilities as a whole? Perhaps over time the agency should
aspire to give some effect to each and every provision it enforces, but in practice doing so will likely prove impossible in any context in which new violations are constantly arising. On the contrary, the agency may properly
prioritize new violations it judges to be more serious for the same reasons it
prioritized past cases that it judged to be more serious.232 The Justice
Department might well choose always to focus more resources on terrorism
offenses than marijuana possession; immigration authorities might consistently concentrate more resources on removing immigrants who commit
crimes than those who do not.233
In Heckler, the Court cited the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Adams v. Richardson as an apparent example of abdication.234 Yet Adams may then be the
exception that proves the rule: in Adams the court set aside an agency’s
apparent practice of giving no force whatsoever over an extended period to
civil rights laws prohibiting disbursement of federal funds to segregated
schools.235 Outside of such extreme facts—a demonstrably well-funded
agency failing totally, over an extended period and at a high level of general231 See, e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 168–70 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding
no abdication where agency relied on another agency’s regulatory efforts to address issue).
232 See, e.g., Salmon Spawning & Recovery All. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 550 F.3d
1121, 1128–29 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying Heckler to reject challenge to agency’s alleged
total failure to enforce ban on importing endangered species against illegal salmon
imports); Am. Disabled for Attendant Programs Today v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 170 F.3d 381, 384–85 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting abdication claim based on agency’s
alleged total failure to enforce particular regulation).
233 Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have recently proposed extending Heckler’s
anti-abdication principle to agency delays addressing regulatory concerns. Under this proposal, which the authors themselves describe as “vague and not easily subject to judicial
administration,” an agency could not invoke resource allocation “repeatedly to keep a particular action at the back of the queue forever.” Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 157, at
162. Whatever the force of this proposal in the regulatory context, it has limited utility in
the enforcement context in which the abdication concept originated. The Justice Department and other agencies do effectively keep particular types of violations at the back of the
queue forever, precisely because other more pressing infractions are continually arising.
234 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (citing 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
235 Adams, 480 F.2d at 1163–65.
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ity, to implement a policy whose importance has objective constitutional
underpinnings236—Heckler’s abdication principle will rarely provide a principled way out of the problem of judicial unmanageability with respect to
nonenforcement.237
In sum, at least in enforcement contexts characterized by severe
resource-allocation challenges and a built-in expectation of heavily discretionary enforcement, judicial review of priority-setting agency enforcement
policies will typically present unmanageable legal questions, in the peculiar
sense that term has acquired in the political question context. The problem
is not (or at least not necessarily) that the executive branch holds a core
Article II prerogative to decline implementation of statutory policies. On the
contrary, the Take Care Clause imposes a core obligation of faithful execution, and judicial review normally seeks to ensure faithful implementation of
statutory policies. Insofar as an agency is simply prioritizing some violations
over others in its enforcement efforts, however, courts lack the institutional
legitimacy and competence to second-guess agency choices, and proposals to
probe executive good faith or prevent abdication fail to provide a meaningful
way out of this conundrum. Courts, accordingly, should rarely look past a
facially reasonable justification, framed in terms of resource allocation and
the agency’s overall statutory mission, for focusing criminal or civil enforcement efforts in one area rather than another, if that is all the policy effectively does. Defining when this form of nonenforcement goes too far—when
it crosses the boundary from faithful execution to deliberate undercutting of
statutory objectives—is an inevitably imprecise undertaking; it is often more a
matter of mindset and degree than any bright-line formulation. For that very
reason, it is also judicially unmanageable: absent more specific statutory
direction, courts lack principled, objective guideposts for determining that
an agency must focus on one set of violations rather than another.
Limiting judicial review in this manner carries considerable potential
costs to congressional supremacy in lawmaking: as the marijuana example
well illustrates, it potentially allows enforcement agencies to make choices of
enormous practical significance based on vague incantations of resource limitations and presumed enforcement discretion. For this reason, I have
argued elsewhere that executive officials generally should not presume
authority to make broad categorical exclusions from enforcement based on
policy disagreement with the underlying substantive law.238 But whether or
236 Id. The nonenforcement in Adams, moreover, involved denial of funds, rather than
pursuit of more affirmative penalties. The court suggested this feature of the policy made
concerns about resource constraints and judicial unmanageability less compelling: “It is
one thing to say the Justice Department lacks the resources necessary to locate and prosecute every civil rights violator; it is quite another to say HEW may affirmatively continue to
channel federal funds to defaulting schools.” Id. at 1162.
237 Cf. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding
Nuclear Regulatory Commission would have abdicated its responsibility “only if it has
established a policy not to protect adequately public health and safety with respect to
nuclear plants”).
238 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 10.
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not that view of executive responsibility is persuasive, the key point here is
that limitations on judicial review have an independent basis. Reviewing
nonenforcement decisions and policies will often tax courts’ institutional
legitimacy and competence, and such concerns about judicial capacity may
abundantly justify existing limits on judicial review of nonenforcement.
Framing judicial review’s limits in these terms, however, carries important
normative implications for current debates, implications to which I now turn.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Beyond its descriptive value, reframing the problem of judicial review of
executive nonenforcement in terms of judicial incapacity rather than executive prerogative carries a number of implications. Without attempting to
fully explore all possibilities, the following discussion briefly addresses several
important normative implications. First, framing the unreviewability of nonenforcement in terms of judicial incapacity highlights that the executive
branch may hold obligations of faithful execution, as a matter of conscience
and political accountability, that extend beyond any responsibility courts will
enforce. Second, the framework supports refocusing Heckler’s presumption
of unreviewability so as to permit review of enforcement policies that formally or functionally alter legal obligations in ways that go beyond the sort of
purely negative judgment that Heckler deems unmanageable. Third, the
framework supports a more active judicial role in approving DPAs than
courts have played to date. Finally, and most tentatively, the framework supports rethinking standing doctrine to track problems of judicial
unmanageability and likely congressional intent rather than an amorphous
conception of constitutionally adequate injury.
A. Judicial Power and Executive Duty
The most direct and important implication of framing law enforcement
as a political question is to highlight the gap between judicial power and
executive duty. As the Supreme Court has emphasized with respect to other
political questions, the decision that some legal obligation is not judicially
enforceable is “very different” from determining that no legal obligation has
been breached.239 Indeed, one key purpose of deeming the question political is to impose accountability more squarely on the branch that made the
determination in the first instance. Here, too, to the extent executive law
enforcement choices are political questions, either because of textual assignment or absence of judicially manageable standards (or both), the reasons
owe as much or more to institutional limitations on courts as to any persuasive conception of executive authority.
Certain executive nonenforcement decisions, or even entire nonenforcement policies, may violate ideal understandings of faithful execution
and yet nonetheless evade judicial correction. In particular, disingenuous
239

U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992) (footnotes omitted).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL411.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 49

law enforcement as political question

16-MAY-16

14:39

1619

nonenforcement—policies and practices designed to weaken or undermine
statutory policies rather than simply to focus resources to achieve greater
compliance overall—may in principle defy an appropriate conception of
executive responsibility. Such underenforcement indeed typified many regulatory agencies’ practices during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Reagan’s EPA, for example, slashed overall enforcement rates dramatically while
formally abolishing the agency’s Office of Enforcement and transferring its
functions to the agency’s legal office; civil rights and OSHA enforcement also
declined dramatically, in ways political opponents in Congress criticized and
resisted.240 Similarly, the Bush Administration apparently continued invalidated environmental safe harbors as a matter of enforcement practice even
after a federal court deemed them inconsistent with the statute.241 Even the
current administration’s marijuana enforcement policies, while framed in
heavily caveated and noncommittal terms that I have elsewhere characterized
as consistent with an appropriate executive mindset,242 might come to violate
an appropriate fidelity to statutory policies. The administration has already
extended these policies beyond core marijuana offenses of possession and
distribution to related financial crimes. In practice, moreover, despite their
caveated character, the policies may well be hardening into the sort of perceived ironclad assurance of nonenforcement that executive officials generally should not presume authority to make.
Although all these examples present forms of potentially illegitimate policy-based nonenforcement of federal laws, they are also all examples of the
sort of executive foot-dragging that I have argued courts have great difficulty
correcting. That is true in part because in some cases ultimate redress might
require compelling in-court prosecution, a remedy I have argued violates the
separation of powers. But it is also true because judicial second-guessing of
executive actions would involve questions of relative importance and appropriate managerial focus that courts have generally deemed unmanageable.
Even apart from problems of reviewability addressed here, standing limits
and other procedural doctrines may limit courts’ ability ever to hear a case
challenging such executive choices. Yet even without judicial oversight, the
executive branch retains an obligation, as a matter of “accountab[ility]” and
“conscience,”243 to execute congressional enactments faithfully, however
imprecise and contested the content of that obligation may be.
On some level, this understanding is no doubt intuitive to many executive branch officials. Conscientious executive officials approach law enforcement responsibilities with a sense of obligation to the law, tempered by
appreciation for the very real practical discretion they exercise (and guided,

240 For discussion of these examples, see Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, supra note 17,
at 1125–27.
241 See sources collected in Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 10, at 762–63.
242 Id. at 756–59.
243 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803).
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of course, by directives from any more senior officials).244 At the same time,
this framing captures important features of public debates over enforcement.
Although partisan animosity has made debates over Obama Administration
policies particularly fevered, past debates under Republican administrations
have also been inflected by assertions of legal obligation, in much the same
way that debates over other political questions (such as war powers and foreign affairs) include legal dimensions notwithstanding courts’ reluctance to
consider the issues.245
More concretely, the framework supports independent elaboration of
legal limits on enforcement discretion by the executive branch itself. OLC’s
important recent immigration opinion did just that. It expressly recognized
the gap between executive obligation and judicial review with respect to
enforcement, and indeed denied approval to one proposed program that
transgressed boundaries it independently articulated. As the Office correctly
observed, “Limits on enforcement discretion are both implicit in, and fundamental to, the Constitution’s allocation of governmental powers between the
two political branches,” even if those limits are “not clearly defined” and “the
exercise of enforcement discretion generally is not subject to judicial
review.”246 Whether or not its bottom-line conclusions are persuasive (an
issue I do not address here247), independent executive consideration of the
issue is important in this context, as with respect to other political questions.
Courts can do their part, too. In particular, courts might reinforce the
appropriate executive mindset by being clearer about the reasons for judicial
passivity with respect to executive nonenforcement. In Heckler and other key
cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked nonenforcement’s judicial
244 The parenthetical point might seem to go without saying, but some immigration
enforcement officials recently attempted suing to invalidate guidance from their superiors.
See David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws
in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167, 181–83 (2012) (discussing lawsuit). For discussion of enforcement officers’ apparent failure to follow priorities established by superiors before DACA and DAPA, see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at
191–93.
245 See, e.g., Changing Tides: Exploring the Current State of Civil Rights Enforcement Within the
Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (prepared statement of Rep.
Jerrold Nadler) (“If the rule of law is to have any meaning, if the civil rights laws this
Committee produces are to have any value, then we must be assured that those laws will be
enforced without fear or favor or political contamination.”); H.R. REP. NO. 113-561, pt. 1,
at 2 (2014) (complaining that the President has “ignored certain statutes completely, selectively enforced others, and bypassed the legislative process to create his own laws by executive fiat”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-968, at 11 (1982) (asserting that the “[t]he power conferred by
the Constitution under [the Take Care Clause] is primarily to empower the President simply to carry out the laws enacted by Congress” and that Congress may “evaluat[e]” through
oversight “the administration of the laws passed by Congress which the President is to
‘faithfully’ execute”).
246 OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 5.
247 For differing perspectives, see sources cited infra notes 309–14.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL411.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 51

law enforcement as political question

16-MAY-16

14:39

1621

unmanageability—its “general unsuitability for judicial review”248—as a central basis for limited judicial intrusion on nonenforcement. At the same
time, many have presumed that limited judicial review implies absolute executive discretion. But this equation is false. The central import of the political question doctrine is that judicial remedies do not always exhaust legal and
constitutional obligations. As one scholar observes in another context, “In a
world in which enforcing the Constitution is seen as overwhelmingly the
responsibility of the courts, assignment of constitutional questions wholly
outside of the judicial branch too easily becomes equated with denying that
those questions have any real constitutional basis.”249 Here, too, a clear
holding that enforcement choices are political questions, in the sense that
they belong institutionally to the executive branch rather than the courts,
could help encourage an appropriate sense of internal obligation within the
executive branch.250
B. Refocusing Heckler
A second important implication relates to Heckler’s presumption of
unreviewability under the APA. If judicial unmanageability provides the most
cogent explanation for viewing nonenforcement decisions as “committed to
agency discretion by law,” and if problems of judicial unmanageability further support highly deferential review of even more general enforcement priorities, then by the same token courts should interpret the APA to permit
more intensive scrutiny when problems of judicial unmanageability are
absent. In particular, insofar as review is otherwise available, Heckler should
not prevent courts from policing in at least limited ways the most important
substantive limit on enforcement discretion: that as a default matter, enforcement discretion is an authority to ignore but not authorize, to allocate effort
but not to change effective governing law.251 At least two types of policies
may raise this concern in a judicially manageable fashion: those that purport
to change legal obligations formally as an exercise of enforcement discretion,
248 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
249 Metzger, supra note 208, at 1911; cf. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (holding that although courts have “no leave to intrude” on agency decisions regarding allocation of resources from a lump-sum appropriation, “we hardly need to note that an agency’s
decision to ignore congressional expectations may expose it to grave political
consequences”).
250 Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 327 (2002) (“Placing some
interpretive power with the political branches also insures [sic] that those branches will, as
a general matter, be more attentive to constitutional concerns.”); Michael J. Gerhardt,
Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 776 (2008) (“[J]udicial supremacy is problematic because it will discourage non-judicial actors from taking their own, independent constitutional interpretation seriously.”).
251 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 10, at 674–75; cf. Cox & Rodriguez, supra
note 63, at 143 (noting general agreement that “the President cannot decline to enforce
altogether a law that is constitutional”).
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and those that do so functionally in ways that go beyond the practically inevitable priority-setting inherent in resource-constrained enforcement.
1. Formal Changes in Law
To begin with, Heckler has no relevance to policies and administrative
actions that formally alter law rather than simply decline to enforce it. Policies that purport to change general legal obligations require a basis in delegated interpretive or rulemaking authority, not mere enforcement
discretion. Accordingly, to fall within Heckler’s presumption, a policy must be
framed in terms of the problems of unmanageability that support Heckler’s
APA interpretation—they must establish priorities for current enforcement,
not definite assurance that prohibited conduct will be considered lawful.
The Supreme Court recently drew this distinction forcefully in Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG).252 The Court there invalidated, as inconsistent with unambiguous statutory text, an EPA rule regulating certain greenhouse gas emissions but adjusting upward (by a factor of roughly a thousand)
statutory pollution thresholds for required permits.253 The Court then
explained that enforcement discretion failed to provide authority for this
“Tailoring Rule.”254 “The Tailoring Rule,” the Court explained, “is not just
an announcement of EPA’s refusal to enforce the statutory permitting
requirements; it purports to alter those requirements and to establish with
the force of law that otherwise-prohibited conduct will not violate the Act.”255
Indeed, such substantive effect was essential to the rule’s operation, as the
statute in question permits private as well as public enforcement of substantive requirements; private citizens could thus sue to enforce statutory thresholds if the agency did not.256 Yet if the agency lacked interpretive authority
to adopt the rule, as the Court held (whether correctly or not),257 then the
agency also lacked authority to achieve the same substantive result through
nonenforcement. “An agency confronting resource constraints,” the Court
held, “may change its own conduct, but it cannot change the law.”258
In UARG’s peculiar statutory context, this holding reinforced the
Court’s conclusion that a broader regulatory program as a whole was inconsistent with applicable statutes. In other cases, however, this principle may
252 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
253 Id. at 2446.
254 Id. at 2445.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See id. at 2449–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For two conflicting critical assessments of
the decision in light of current congressional gridlock, see Michael S. Greve & Ashley C.
Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 502 (2015) (arguing that congressional incapacity gives rise to several troubling administrative practices),
and Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7
(2014) (arguing that congressional incapacity supports greater deference to agency
interpretations).
258 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2445.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL411.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 53

law enforcement as political question

16-MAY-16

14:39

1623

support invalidating unduly permissive rules and policies that purport to
excuse conduct prohibited by applicable substantive law. Doing so requires
no unmanageable assessment of relative importance; it involves only straightforward legal interpretation (under applicable principles of deference). To
be sure, even if its interpretation is invalid, the agency might nonetheless
choose not to enforce in particular cases. But judicial intervention is nevertheless meaningful, as it restores the deterrent effect of the background law.
Furthermore, without such invalidation, regulated parties might well have a
due process right to rely on the agency’s statement of law, notwithstanding its
invalidity.259 Judicial review of such rules and policies thus may powerfully
enforce the basic principle that enforcement discretion is an authority to
ignore but not authorize.
For much the same reason, as some courts have recognized, administrative decisions to grant waivers, licenses, and permits are not nonenforcement
and therefore fall outside Heckler’s presumption.260 By definition, these
actions affirmatively change legal obligations; they legalize conduct that
would otherwise violate applicable statutes or regulations.261 To be sure,
whether to enforce legal prohibitions following the denial of a waiver or permit, or against parties who fail to apply for them in the first place, may present questions of enforcement discretion within Heckler’s scope.262 But
waiver and permitting decisions themselves do not implicate the particular
problems of resource-allocation and judicial unmanageability addressed
above.
These principles, finally, may be relevant to some statutory schemes that,
in context, seem designed to require affirmative approval for conduct rather
than simply providing for after-the-fact enforcement. At the least, this possibility may account for an otherwise perplexing (and controversial) decision
by the D.C. Circuit, Cook v. FDA.263 Addressing facts oddly similar to Heckler’s, the Cook court held that the FDA’s announced policy of allowing importation of lethal-injection drugs to state officials administering capital
punishment was reviewable despite Heckler and legally invalid. But while
259 See, e.g., United States v. Penn. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 670 (1973) (recognizing due process defense to prosecution where defendant relied on “longstanding,
official administrative construction” of statute).
260 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (distinguishing “affirmative
act[s] of approval under a statute”); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 789
F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 2015) (license grant reviewable).
261 See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 265, 274 (2013) (“[W]aiver immunizes; nonenforcement merely looks the other
way.”); Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory
Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 144 (2014) (discussing definition of
licenses and permits and applicable APA provisions).
262 See Biber, Judicial Review, supra note 16, at 498–99 (drawing this distinction).
263 733 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). For criticism, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 457 (2015) (“The
DC Circuit came very close to simply declining to follow controlling Supreme Court precedent on reviewability of agency action in [Cook].”).
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Heckler involved domestic production and distribution of the allegedly unapproved and unsafe drugs, Cook involved their importation from unregistered
facilities overseas. Parsing the specific statutes governing drug importation,
the Cook panel concluded that, notwithstanding Heckler, the FDA held a
mandatory duty, first, to sample drugs imported from unregistered overseas
facilities and, second, to “refuse[ ] admission” to any that “appear[ed]” to be
an unapproved new drug or violate certain other statutory requirements.264
Assuming the court correctly construed these statutory requirements,
Cook thus involved a choice to affirmatively allow otherwise forbidden prospective conduct, that is, importation of unapproved drugs from an unregistered facility. In contrast, Heckler, as the Cook court recognized, involved
retrospective application of punitive and coercive remedies to alleged
existing legal violations—the distribution and use of allegedly misbranded
and unapproved new drugs. The statutory scheme in Cook, unlike in Heckler,
thus effectively created a permitting regime—a regime under which the conduct in question was prohibited unless authorized, rather than tolerated
unless punished.265 The Cook court expressly recognized that the FDA could
continue to “exercise enforcement discretion to allow the domestic distribution of a misbranded or unapproved new drug, as the Supreme Court recognized in [Heckler].”266 Such a policy simply invites those using and
distributing the drug to take their chances that the agency will not in the
future shift priorities and prosecute them. But the FDA could not issue a
blanket policy statement, as it had done in Cook, exempting the imports from
review and approval and thus allowing the drugs’ automatic importation.267
By removing the default barrier to importation that Congress imposed, such
a policy changes prospective legal obligations in a manner that a retrospective enforcement policy of the sort the Supreme Court considered in Heckler
does not.
So understood, Cook, like UARG, illustrates the key outer boundary to
Heckler: the boundary between retrospective priority-setting, which courts
cannot manageably assess, and affirmative legal permission, which they can.
2. Functional Changes in Law
More difficult cases arise along the margins between nonenforcement
and affirmative permission—actions that may functionally change law, even if
they do not do so formally. As we have seen, any announced nonenforcement policy has this effect to some degree; by lowering the perceived risk of
enforcement, such policies may free regulated parties to engage in prohibited conduct. The marijuana policies again powerfully demonstrate this
264 Cook, 733 F.3d at 3.
265 Cf. John Harrison, Libertarian Administrative Law, or Administrative Law?, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. DIALOGUE 134, 147 (2015) (“Because refusal of admission is relatively inexpensive,
it is easy to believe that the FDA is required to refuse admission to every single drug it
determines is misbranded or unapproved.”).
266 Cook, 733 F.3d at 9–10.
267 Id.
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effect. As some hapless defendants have discovered, the policies do not provide any binding assurance of nonenforcement.268 Nor do they prevent
other incidental legal burdens, potentially including civil liability, that track
underlying criminal prohibitions.269 Even so, these policies have dramatically altered private behavior, in a manner that even an undisclosed policy
producing the same pattern of enforcement results likely would not have
done.
Courts, I have argued, generally lack manageable standards for assessing
the validity of such policies, despite their real-world effects, but that is true
only insofar as such policies simply exercise overtly and formally a form of
priority-setting that would be practically inevitable internally and informally
in any event. As policies climb the ladder away from this inevitable prioritysetting towards more affirmative assurances of nonenforcement, this calculus
may change: courts may sometimes manageably assess whether adequate
authority exists for the executive policy. That is true, to a limited degree,
with respect to at least two types of policies.
First, even if they do not purport formally to change legal requirements,
nonenforcement policies that are overly definitive—policies framed in terms
of categorical assurances rather than precatory priorities—raise particular
concerns about functional change in legal obligations. I have argued elsewhere that default separation of powers principles support a general presumption against categorical (as opposed to case-by-case) nonenforcement
and that this presumption remains a useful heuristic in assessing faithful execution even when full enforcement is impossible.270 UARG inadvertently
illustrates this point. The Court there held that the Tailoring Rule could not
be justified as enforcement discretion because citizen-suit provisions in the
statute effectively ousted the agency’s enforcement discretion, permitting it
to tailor substantive prohibitions only by interpreting them away, rather than
simply not enforcing them.271 But suppose the statute provided only for official enforcement. In that case, a tailoring rule regarding agency enforcement would effectively replace background substantive requirements as the
law regulated parties would need to follow. Yet if resource constraints can
justify only a change in an agency’s “own conduct,” but not “the law,” how
could such a policy constitute faithful execution of the statute?272
268 See, e.g., Oakland v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 1159, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2015).
269 See William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 65 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 513, 517 (2015) (discussing burdens derived from “unenforced federal law”
that civil racketeering liability and other restraints may impose).
270 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 10, at 674–77.
271 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014).
272 Id. Some decisions have overcome Heckler’s presumption of unreviewability and
found “law to apply” when the agency itself has imposed binding rules on its enforcement
practices. See, e.g., GoJet Airlines, LLC v. FAA, 743 F.3d 1168, 1173–74 (8th Cir. 2014)
(deeming Heckler presumption overcome “if the agency has made clear its intent that a
policy statement or set of enforcement guidelines impose binding limitations on the exercise of its enforcement discretion”). These decisions, however, have typically involved
essentially procedural restraints with only incidental effects on substantive obligations and
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To avoid this problem, a degree of precatory indeterminacy in enforcement policies is often an important expression of fidelity to background substantive law. Pasting a sign below a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit that says
“enforced only against drivers exceeding 65 miles per hour” changes the
effective law (from the perspective of regulated parties at least) in a more
significant way than either an undisclosed internal police guideline or a less
definitive policy. In principle, then, framing enforcement policies is not an
entirely ungoverned choice between rules and standards, as some have
argued.273 In crafting substantive statutes or rules or common-law doctrines,
the choice between rules and standards involves a straightforward tradeoff
between the imprecision and unpredictability of standards, on the one hand,
and the inevitable over- and under-inclusiveness of rules, on the other.274 In
contrast, a nonenforcement policy by definition does less than the background law requires; the only question is how much less is permissible and
why.
This intuition, indeed, underlies case law mentioned earlier that seeks to
identify legislative rules requiring notice-and-comment procedures based in
part on whether the rule appears practically binding.275 Though heavily criticized as an interpretation of the notice-and-comment exceptions,276 this
case law does at least indirectly enforce the requirement of indeterminacy in
moreover have generally involved rules aimed at achieving broader enforcement and compliance rather than eliminating enforcement. See, e.g., id. at 1173–74 (reviewing whether
agency complied with rules regarding enforcement following voluntary disclosure of aircraft maintenance issue but describing rule as “prescribing the agency’s procedures, not its
substantive standards for enforcing the regulations at issue”); Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078,
1085 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing rule requiring hearing in certain circumstances but
deeming it inapplicable); Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Baldrige, 827 F.2d
1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1987) (requiring investigation following filing of complaint where
regulation created “no ambiguity concerning the Department’s duty to investigate a complaint”). But cf. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (deeming reasonable an agency rule precluding enforcement of legal requirements not included in permit
under statute but noting agency’s intent “to include all of the applicable statutory requirements in each permit and to enforce each permit fully”).
273 See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 176, 180–83.
274 See id. (describing tradeoffs).
275 See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(noting focus of analysis on “actual legal effect” of policy and whether the agency has
applied it “as if it were binding on regulated parties”); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil
Co., 796 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (deeming enforcement policy a non-legislative rule
because it was “replete with indications that the Secretary retained his discretion to cite
production-operators as he saw fit” and gave regulated parties no reason to think that
“failure to meet their responsibilities will, except in the instances described in the guidelines, categorically go unsanctioned”). For an argument that policy documents generally
should avoid “fixed criteria” for decisions, see Robert A. Anthony, A Taxonomy of Federal
Agency Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2000) (“The agency must treat the document
as tentative and prospective, without present binding effect on private persons, and the
agency must keep an open mind and be prepared to reconsider the policy as individual
cases arise.”).
276 For one critical assessment, see Seidenfeld, supra note 53, at 245–47.
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nonenforcement policies: agencies avoid framing such policies in definitive
terms, because doing so increases the likelihood that courts will require
costly notice-and-comment procedures.277 In at least some contexts, however, the issue may be substantive as well as procedural. If conduct falls
within a statutory prohibition that the agency cannot plausibly interpret not
to apply, then notice-and-comment procedures may well be beneficial with
respect to the agency’s formulation of enforcement policy, but they cannot
provide authority that would otherwise be lacking to implement an overly
definitive assurance of nonenforcement.278
Courts accordingly should set aside otherwise reviewable nonenforcement policies that are framed in entirely categorical terms and cannot be
justified as interpretation. To give one example highlighted in a recent
essay, were the IRS to announce, as it has in one policy, that it “will not
assert” that any taxpayer has underreported income by failing to include certain received benefits, and that “[a]ny future guidance on the taxability of
these benefits will be applied prospectively,”279 then courts should set aside
the policy as substantively invalid unless it can be justified as a valid interpretation of underlying tax laws.280 Doing so might in the end affect only the
framing of such policies; the agency might respond with a policy framed in
more precatory terms, describing enforcement as a low priority rather than a
definite guarantee. But framing matters in nonenforcement policies: a riskaverse taxpayer might well choose to comply in the latter case but not the
former. What is more, the more precatory formulation might help
encourage an appropriate mindset among agency personnel about the limits
of their authority to rewrite effective requirements that Congress has

277 See id. at 384 (noting that “agencies often write [policy statements] in nonmandatory language to avoid having them struck down as legislative rules”).
278 The one caveat to this statement is that proceeding through notice and comment
could elevate the level of deference the agency’s interpretation of its statutory authority
would receive. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)
(holding that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding Chevron
deference may not apply to policy documents adopted without notice and comment); City
of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (holding that Chevron deference may
apply to agencies’ resolutions of “statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of the
agency’s statutory authority”).
279 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNOUNCEMENT 2002-18, FREQUENT FLYER MILES ATTRIBUTABLE TO BUSINESS OR OFFICIAL TRAVEL; see also generally Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the
Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829, 834 (2012) (contrasting
this assertion with “simple underenforcement of the law without any indication (beyond
the mere underenforcement) that the IRS acquiesces in widespread noncompliance with
the Code”).
280 For discussion of the merits of this interpretive issue, see Zelenak, supra note 279, at
837–38 (arguing this notice is not supported by valid interpretation), and Alice G. Abreu &
Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 333–48 (2011) (arguing
opposite).
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imposed.281 In some contexts a more precatory policy might also create a
broader opening for regulatory beneficiaries to petition for enforcement in
unusual cases.
All that said, courts should enforce this principle in only the clearest
cases. Framing nonenforcement priorities in relatively categorical terms may
sometimes carry important benefits. In particular, such policies may enable
greater consistency of implementation and hierarchical control throughout a
far-flung agency.282 Furthermore, insofar as policies fall along a spectrum of
definitiveness, determining where to draw the line—how categorical is too
categorical?—may itself be unmanageable. Indeed, some scholars have
faulted the “practical effect” analysis for legislative rules on precisely this
basis.283 In assessing the agency’s ultimate authority, moreover, courts
should be loath to look past the face of the policy to its actual implementation, as some courts have done in assessing the binding effect of putatively
non-legislative rules.284 Relatively categorical implementation of even indefinitely framed priorities may often strike the best balance possible between
legitimate competing objectives—maintaining internal discipline and signaling particular regulatory concerns, on the one hand, and avoiding excusing
unlawful conduct outside the agency’s priorities on the other.285 Much as
with the choice whether to formulate a policy in the first place, the balance
of these tradeoffs is likely not an inquiry that courts can objectively manage.
A second type of policy, however, may take the problem of categorical
assurance a step further by providing assurances that are not only categorical
but also prospective—that is, expressly applicable to future as well as past or
current conduct. Although immigration is unique in many ways (some
addressed below286) and this characterization is itself disputed in current litigation, DACA and DAPA in effect have this character. These programs invite
large categories of undocumented immigrants to apply for deferred action, a
formally revocable (but likely practically effective) promise of non-removal
for a specified period (here three years).287 Although the programs involve
a degree of case-by-case consideration, they appear designed to make defer281 Cf. Zelenak, supra note 279, at 851 (worrying that unchecked authority to create
statutory exceptions could lead tax administrators to “believe they have the power and the
authority to disregard any Code section when doing so would further their notion (not
Congress’s notion) of good tax policy”).
282 See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 194–95; Metzger, supra note 208, at 1929.
283 See Manning, supra note 98, at 916 (“[B]ecause an agency’s power to adopt meaningfully binding nonlegislative rules thus turns on distinguishing interpretation from policymaking, the resulting inquiry involves a question of degree perhaps no less elusive than
the inquiries described above.”).
284 See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
285 Cf. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 198 n.268 (acknowledging the possibility of
formally precatory but practically binding enforcement policy but doubting its viability);
Seidenfeld, supra note 53, at 384 (noting that the precatory character of guidance documents generally “does not hide how the agency intends for the rule to operate”).
286 See infra text accompanying notes 309–14.
287 See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 206.
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ral the rule rather than the exception for the covered groups.288 Moreover,
under a preexisting regulatory interpretation of the statute, granting
deferred action renders immigrants eligible for work authorization (among
other benefits), which would otherwise be prohibited.289
As even some proponents recognize, the structure of these policies—
affirmative assurance of nonenforcement to a broad subset of parties
engaged in what is arguably a continuing violation of law290—raises concerns
as a model of enforcement discretion precisely because resource constraints,
and resulting underenforcement, are so pervasive in modern criminal justice
and administration.291 DACA’s and DAPA’s beneficiaries are enormously
sympathetic and should be low priorities for removal under any sensible
immigration enforcement policy.292 Furthermore, were the Court to accept
the government’s characterization of the programs as nothing more than
conventional priority-setting, all the problems of judicial manageability
addressed earlier would justify a limited judicial role. Yet the peculiarly
definitive form of nonenforcement involved in these policies might also distinguish them from such more conventional policies. At the least, if resource
constraints and organic agency enforcement discretion were sufficient by
themselves to justify exercising nonenforcement authority in the form
asserted in these cases, a future administration with different policy predilections might likewise excuse ongoing violations in any number of politically
contested areas of law—pollution limits or tax underpayments or federal firearms prohibitions, for example.293
288 For discussion of the programs’ rule-like character, see id. at 176–77.
289 Classes of Aliens Authorized to Accept Employment, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14)
(2014).
290 Some have argued the relevant violation occurs only at the point of unlawful entry
or visa expiration and thus is not continuing. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 199–200.
While it is true that deterrence concerns may carry less weight with respect to undocumented immigrants who entered the United States long ago, the Supreme Court has characterized removal as a remedy for “an ongoing violation of United States law.” Reno v.
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
291 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 176 n.200 (recognizing policies as “novel”).
292 Reprehensible current political rhetoric in some quarters about the imperative of
removing all undocumented immigrants fundamentally misunderstands the discretionary
character of enforcement within the immigration system as it has evolved. Establishing
priorities for enforcement of substantive laws is a basic and inevitable aspect of administration when full enforcement is impossible, and at least some degree of discretion should be
presumed even when full enforcement is possible. The question DACA and DAPA present
is whether their unusually definitive and prospective character, coupled with the ancillary
changes in legal relations effected by granting deferred action, necessitates more specific
legal authority than the sort of organic agency enforcement discretion that permits general
priority-setting and that Heckler effectively insulates from judicial scrutiny.
293 See David A. Martin, Concerns About a Troubling Presidential Precedent and OLC’s Review
of Its Validity, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:30 AM), http://www.balkin.blogspot.com/
2014/11/concerns-about-troubling-presidential.html (describing DAPA as “setting a dangerous precedent that will be used by future Presidents to undercut other regulatory
regimes”).
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Reviewing courts should therefore seek immigration-specific authority
for DACA and DAPA. Doing so might properly entail reliance on somewhat
unconventional considerations such as past executive practice and congressional ratification (the approach OLC employed),294 and executive officials
should perhaps receive deference with respect to judgments about the ultimate scale of the programs and their utility in concentrating resources more
effectively on higher-priority objectives. Nevertheless, as lower courts have
recognized, there is ultimately nothing unmanageable about reviewing general enforcement policies for “legal sufficiency.”295 Accordingly, to the
extent the particular form of categorical and prospective relief provided by
these programs requires affirmative statutory authority beyond an agency’s
default organic enforcement discretion (and to the extent the policies are
otherwise reviewable and pertinent issues are properly presented in the litigation296), Heckler should present no obstacle to assessing, however deferentially, whether such authority exists.297
Prior precedent, concededly, has not always recognized this distinction.
But by the same token previous cases highlight the issue’s ramifications well
beyond the immigration context. Consider, for example, the D.C. Circuit’s
recent decision in Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA (AIR).298 In that case, a
divided panel applied Heckler to uphold a Bush Administration environmental program that invited a broad class of polluters to enter identical consent
decrees precluding enforcement, even for future violations, for two years or
more.299 The policy in question applied to “animal feeding operations,” a
type of farm operation that appeared likely to produce pollution exceeding
statutory limits under the Clean Air Act.300 The consent decrees nonetheless
barred future enforcement suits for both past and ongoing violations in
294 OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 23–24.
295 Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 676–77 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
296 As noted, the current challenge to these policies presents additional issues, including ripeness and finality, that I do not attempt to resolve here. Nor do I take any specific
position with respect to standing in immigration-related litigation, apart from tentative
reflections on standing doctrine in general below. See infra Section III.D. In the Fifth
Circuit, a dissenting judge further questioned whether the programs’ substantive (as
opposed to procedural) validity was properly before the court and whether the states had
validly challenged the preexisting regulatory interpretation rendering deferred action
recipients eligible for work authorization. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (2015)
(King, J., dissenting).
297 Because my aim here is to use these programs as examples of a type of action that
should be reviewable despite Heckler, I assume here that the APA, as interpreted in Heckler,
in fact governs review of DAPA and DACA. While the government has argued that a specific immigration statute bars review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2012) (denying jurisdiction
over “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by
the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter”), the Fifth Circuit deemed this provision inapplicable to APA challenges to the programs brought by states. Texas, 809 F.3d at 164-65.
298 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
299 Id. at 1030–33.
300 Id. at 1028.
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exchange for relatively slight civil penalties and participation in an emissionsmonitoring study.301 As one judge complained in dissent, this program
“replace[d] the enforcement scheme in three congressional statutes with an
unauthorized system of nominal taxation of regulated entities.”302 It thus
altered prospective legal obligations on a general basis. To be sure, in any
single enforcement action, courts may well have had no manageable criteria
to second-guess an agency’s choice to resolve the suit by consent decree.303
But here the sum was greater than its parts: by categorically offering general
terms to all covered farm operations, the agency effectively altered the legal
regime for an entire industry, and indeed did so in a way that legally tied the
agency’s hands so as to prevent shifting to more robust enforcement while
the decrees remained in force. The court should have evaluated on the merits whether EPA’s statutes provided sufficient authority for the program and
whether the program was indeed reasonably calculated to achieve long-term
statutory compliance, as the agency claimed.304 It should not have simply
waved the suit away as a challenge to agency enforcement discretion.
OLC, in contrast, recognized the need for more specific indications of
congressional approval in its opinion upholding DAPA.305 DACA and DAPA
are distinguishable from the program in AIR insofar as deferred action,
unlike a consent decree, is not legally binding; the agency in principle may
revoke it at any time. If the programs operate as intended, however, they will
practically bind future enforcement; that is one important reason for providing deferred action rather than relying only on internal priorities.306 Moreover, insofar as providing deferred action enables work authorization (among
other benefits), the policy effects a prospective change in future legal liabilities and obligations.307 Much as in AIR, the sum here is greater than its
301 Id. at 1029–30.
302 Id. at 1037 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
303 See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 252 F.3d 456, 461–62 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding a
case-specific settlement unreviewable).
304 See Ass’n of Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1044–46 (discussing design of program).
For criticism of the program, which apparently proved largely ineffective, see J. Nicholas
Hoover, Can’t You Smell That Smell?: Clean Air Act Fixes for Factory Farm Air Pollution, 6 STAN.
J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 1, 14–16 (2013), and Sarah C. Wilson, Comment, Hogwash! Why Industrial Animal Agriculture Is Not Beyond the Scope of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 439, 466–71 (2007).
305 OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 22–24 (noting the program “raise[s]
particular concerns about whether immigration officials have undertaken to substantively
change the statutory removal system rather than simply adapting its application to individual circumstances” and seeking guidance from “Congress’s history of legislation concerning deferred action”).
306 See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 191–93 (discussing difficulties controlling
enforcement without programs).
307 Whether this change should ultimately be attributed to the policies or the underlying regulation is a difficult issue that I do not attempt to resolve here. The key point here
is that the interaction between the policy and the regulation gives this exercise of nonenforcement authority legal consequences that more conventional prosecutorial discretion—
turning a blind eye to some violations so as to focus on others—does not.
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parts: while courts might have no objective basis to question deferral with
respect to any particular removable immigrant, the scale and generalized
character of these programs, coupled with the prospective nature of the
promised nonenforcement and the change in legal relations effected by work
authorization, creates particular concern about the programs’ consistency
with underlying substantive laws being enforced. Courts may address that
concern without falling afoul of the problems of unmanageability underlying
Heckler. Invalidating the programs, after all, would not necessarily result in
enforcement in any particular case; nor indeed would it preclude adoption
of enforcement priorities that limit the effective risk of removal for immigrants within the affected categories.308
Immigration law holds many peculiarities, and several immigration-specific theories of authority have by now been advanced. OLC itself found sufficient legislative support for DAPA (but not a further proposed program) in
past congressional ratification of analogous executive actions.309 Others
have faulted OLC’s analysis and advanced a broader theory of “de facto delegation” to justify the administration’s action.310 Some view the preexisting
regulatory interpretation of the statute as dispositive,311 or emphasize the
inevitably prospective character of immigration nonenforcement (in which
failing to remove someone effectively means allowing them to stay).312
Whatever the correct view of the merits (a point I do not address here313),
Heckler does not prevent courts from addressing them. At the very least, Heckler should not prevent evaluation of challengers’ claims that the programs in
question exceed the form of conventional, retrospective priority-setting that
Heckler properly exempts from APA review. Here, as with respect to some
overly definitive nonenforcement policies, courts can manageably police the
308 Admittedly, in this particular case, prior efforts to focus enforcement efforts
through such internal guidelines proved ineffective, apparently because of recalcitrant
defiance of the guidelines by low-level enforcement personnel. Cox & Rodriguez, supra
note 63, at 191–93. Distressing as such disobedience is, it seems doubtful whether such
internal managerial difficulties should affect an agency’s ultimate legal authority to adopt a
particular policy, though it might bear on whether the agency was otherwise “arbitrary and
capricious” in doing so.
309 OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 24.
310 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 203 (arguing that in current immigration law “a
perfect world is not a world of perfect enforcement” because “immigration law’s formal
prohibitions do not accurately reflect the structure of the immigrant screening system”).
311 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (2015) (King, J., dissenting).
312 OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 20–21.
313 I have previously expressed skepticism about the legal authority for DACA, which
OLC did not address in its opinion. Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 10, at 759–61;
see OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 14, at 18 n.8. For some theories supporting
DACA, see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63 (de facto delegation); Martin, supra note 293
(emphasizing DACA group’s small size and blamelessness). For an argument that authority for DAPA is lacking, see Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred
Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1194 (2015).
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outer bounds of organic executive nonenforcement authority.314 Doing so is
important because without such immigration-specific analysis, the example
set by these programs could readily migrate into many other areas of law,
such as the environmental enforcement regime considered in AIR, where
concerns about regulatory capture and shortchanging of regulatory beneficiaries would carry greater force.
C. Reviewing Deferred Prosecution Agreements
A third implication of the framework is that Congress may enable a
broader judicial role with respect to nonenforcement if it so chooses. Insofar
as problems of judicial manageability result ultimately from the indeterminacy of statutory priorities rather than any more fundamental limit on judicial power, nothing in the Constitution precludes Congress from authorizing
broader judicial review, so long as Congress stops short of requiring judicially
compelled prosecution. Congress, moreover, might impose limits on executive enforcement discretion either by doing so directly (a possibility Heckler
expressly held open315) or by authorizing judicial elaboration of faithful-execution standards. In at least one important context—DPAs—Congress has
effectively done just that, yet many courts have persisted in rubber-stamping
the parties’ proposals, presumably out of a misplaced fear of interfering with
prosecutorial discretion.
As described earlier, DPAs enable the government to file criminal
charges against an alleged wrongdoer and yet defer actual prosecution without falling afoul of Speedy Trial Act deadlines in exchange for the defendant’s acceptance of specified conditions.316 DPAs thus differ from plea
314 In addition (or in the alternative), insofar as the rules establishing DAPA and DACA
are procedurally valid without notice-and-comment procedures, the policies might properly be subject to more probing arbitrariness review than would be appropriate for more
conventional nonenforcement policies. Mark Seidenfeld has proposed a framework for
substantive review of guidance documents in general. He argues that “reasoned decisionmaking of guidance documents could mandate that agencies explain actions in terms of
factors that are relevant and alternatives that are plausible given the state of knowledge
available to the agency when it acted.” Seidenfeld, supra note 53, at 388. Whether or not
his proposal should apply more generally, it might carry particular force with respect to
policies such as these, which in some sense constitute a peculiar hybrid between enforcement and substantive lawmaking. Again, even if DACA and DAPA could survive such scrutiny, AIR demonstrates its potential value in more conventional enforcement contexts
where judicial review might help ensure the agency is acting in a manner reasonably calculated to bring about maximum eventual compliance with substantive law. Cf. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 215–19 (highlighting “the basic failure of administrative law to
address the central role that enforcement discretion plays in important regulatory arenas”
and suggesting that some mechanism for ensuring public input short of notice-and-comment procedures would be desirable). The Fifth Circuit held that DAPA was procedurally
invalid without notice-and-comment procedures. Texas, 809 F.3d at 177. For criticism of
the view that DAPA is a legislative rule, see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 216 & n.313.
315 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985).
316 See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
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agreements and judicially approved settlements in that they do not involve a
calculated compromise of the two sides’ risks and liabilities. Instead, these
agreements leverage the government’s discretion not to prosecute so as to
induce prospective changes in the targeted firm’s or individual’s behavior.317
Presumably for this reason, courts have shown even greater deference to
DPAs than is typical of settlements and plea deals (which are themselves
reviewed with great deference).318 Yet such absolute judicial passivity is misplaced. By law DPAs are authorized only for a specified purpose—to enable
“the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”319 No separation of powers difficulty, nor any problem of judicial unmanageability, prevents courts
from giving content to this statutory standard.
What practical meaning might this standard carry? The Speedy Trial
Act’s legislative history makes plain that Congress contemplated use of this
device to divert minor, non-violent offenders from criminal punishment, so
as to avoid the stigma of conviction and facilitate their rehabilitation.320 Particularly in light of that background, “good conduct” in this context most
naturally means rehabilitation, that is, a demonstrated commitment to avoid
further crimes of the sort alleged in the underlying charges. A Senate Judiciary Committee report on the Act indicated as much. It referred approvingly
to state and federal experiments with “pretrial diversion or intervention programs in which prosecution of a certain category of defendants is held in
abeyance on the condition that the defendant participate in a social rehabili317 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in Barkow & Barkow, supra
note 75, at 177, 180 (arguing that DPA and NPA conditions may be “fairly characterized as
regulations” because they “directly regulate the company’s operations going forward”).
318 See Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 69, at 1300–01 (noting that “district courts routinely rubber stamp DPAs the same day they are presented for approval”). District judges
have claimed authority to review DPAs’ terms to a limited degree. United States v. Fokker
Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 167 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated and remanded, United States v.
Fokker Servs. B.V., Nos. 15-3016, 15-3017, 2016 WL 1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2016);
United States v. Saena Tech. Corp., Crim. No. 14-66, 2015 WL 6406266, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct.
21, 2015); United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161, at
*3 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). Just as this Article was going to press, the D.C. Circuit reversed
one district-court decision rejecting a DPA. The appellate court held that the Speedy Trial
Act “confers no authority in a court to withold exclusion of time pursuant to a DPA based
on concerns that the government should bring different charges or should charge different defendants.” Fokker Servs., 2016 WL 1319266, at *1. The court appeared to reserve
questions about whether approval could be denied on other grounds. Id. at *8, *11
(declining to address “the precise contours of [the] authority of a court to confirm that a
DPA’s conditions are aimed to assure the defendant’s good conduct” or whether “a court
has authority to reject a DPA if it contains illegal or unethical provisions”).
319 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012) (excluding from STA calculations “[a]ny period of
delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant
to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of
allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct”).
320 See S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 36–37 (1974) (describing the purpose of the Speedy Trial
Act); see also generally ANTHONY PARTRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974 116–18 (1980) (compilation of legislative history
materials).
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tation program.”321 Evidently presuming that the government would otherwise prosecute the defendants in question, the Committee observed: “Of
course, in the absence of a provision allowing the tolling of the speedy trial
time limits, prosecutors would never agree to such diversion programs.”322
Nevertheless, the Committee explained the requirement of judicial
approval—deliberately added to the bill as a change from earlier versions—
as a necessary constraint on potential abuse. By “requir[ing] that exclusion
[of time] only be allowed where deferral of prosecution is conducted ‘with
approval of the court,’ ” the Committee explained, the statute “assures that
the court will be involved in the decision to divert and that the procedure will
not be used by prosecutors and defense counsel to avoid the speedy trial time
limits.”323
While it may not be entirely clear what rehabilitation means in the corporate context, this statutory structure plainly does not leave defining “good
conduct” up to the executive branch alone. Though now restricted by internal Justice Department guidance, some past DPAs have included terms bearing no evident relation to assuring future compliance with the statutes being
enforced.324 In the most notorious cases, the agreements have required
endowing a law school professorship as a remedy for suspected price-fixing,
promising to retain a specified number of jobs in the state to remedy
accounting fraud charges, and installing slot machines (to ensure state gambling revenue) as a remedy for alleged fraud and corruption.325 On the
other hand, some commentators have faulted many DPAs for doing too little
to assure genuine reform within the targeted firm.326 As one thorough
recent study reports, “many corporate prosecution agreements do not
impose serious structural reforms.”327 A more active judicial role could prevent abuses in both directions—both those that leverage threats of prosecution to impose unrelated conditions, and those that grant deferrals with
insufficient assurance of genuine rehabilitation.328
The framework developed here makes clear why such judicial elaboration of appropriate DPA standards violates no constitutional prerogative of
the executive branch. Judicial oversight of executive nonenforcement is normally unmanageable, in the peculiar sense the term has developed in politi321 S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 36 (1974).
322 Id. at 37.
323 Id.
324 Internal Department guidance now instructs that agreements should not include
terms requiring payments to private parties unless the party was “a victim of the criminal
activity” or is “providing services to redress the harm caused by the defendant’s criminal
conduct.” OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL
§ 9-16.325 (2010).
325 See GARRETT, supra note 69, at 76–77.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 276.
328 Brandon Garrett, for example, argues that judges should oversee implementation of
structural reform requirements in DPAs, rather than leaving the task to outside monitors
(as is most common today). Id. at 192–93.
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cal question cases, because Congress has foisted enforcement choices onto
the executive branch that courts lack any objective yardstick to assess. But by
the same token the Constitution poses no obstacle to common-law judicial
standard-setting in contexts where Congress provides for it. In other words,
if courts normally abstain from policing executive enforcement choices
because they lack legitimacy and institutional competence to do so, the rationale for such judicial passivity disappears when Congress legitimates a more
robust judicial role. To be sure, any judicially developed standards might
well give significant deference to executive judgments, particularly with
respect to the strength of the government’s case and the appropriate balance
between forbearance and punishment with respect to fines and other punitive measures. But whatever else it intended when it passed the STA, Congress expressly provided for a judicial role in policing the novel practice of
DPAs. Article II affords no reason for courts to refrain completely from exercising this power.
D. Rethinking Standing
Finally, and most tentatively, the framework developed here has implications for long-running debates over Article III standing to challenge government inaction. In its leading decisions on standing to challenge executive
inaction, the Court has associated Article III limitations on cognizable injury
with Article II authorities of the executive branch. In particular, the Court
has suggested that complaints shared by the public as a whole are properly
matters for resolution by politically accountable executive officials, not federal courts.329 Yet standing limits at best insulate executive enforcement
decisions from judicial oversight only indirectly. As Heather Elliott observes,
“The question whether a particular plaintiff has standing is essentially unrelated to the question whether Congress violates the Constitution by enlisting
the courts to fight its battles with the executive branch.”330
At least in the nonenforcement context, viewing law enforcement as a
political question responds more directly to concerns about improper judicial oversight of fundamentally executive functions. In Lujan, for example,
the Court objected to plaintiffs “complaining of an agency’s unlawful failure
to impose a requirement or prohibition upon someone else.”331 Yet prohibiting compelled prosecution addresses this concern on the merits with respect
to particular enforcement suits, while recognizing that most nonenforcement
decisions are judicially unmanageable protects such decisions more generally
329 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (“The doctrine of
standing . . . ‘serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of
the political branches.’” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146
(2013))).
330 Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 497 (2008).
331 Scalia, supra note 52, at 894 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208 (1974)); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (noting
difficulty of proving standing where “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else”).
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from judicial second-guessing. Even under Lujan, after all, standing doctrine
permits complaints about executive failure to enforce laws in particular cases,
provided the complaining party can establish a concrete, redressable injury
traceable to the government’s inaction. The political question framework
developed here thus addresses more directly when judicial interference is
unwarranted. If the Court believes nonenforcement should be left to political (rather than judicial) accountability in a broader set of circumstances,
either because of an executive nonenforcement prerogative or because the
problem is judicially unmanageable, it should say so directly and spare litigants the need to debate fine points about the concreteness of their injuries.
Recognizing that the central obstacle to meaningful judicial review is often a
lack of manageable standards, rather than any more fundamental Article II
limit, thus reinforces the longstanding critique that standing doctrine should
not preclude legal challenges where Congress has specifically provided for
them.332
That is not to say that the floodgates should necessarily be opened to
litigation challenging executive nonenforcement. Recognizing law enforcement as a political question instead reinforces longstanding arguments for
treating standing as an essentially statutory rather than constitutional
inquiry.333 Even today, standing has both statutory and constitutional components. The APA generally limits suits to persons “suffering legal wrong” or
“adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute,” capacious terms that invite judicial elaboration.334 Accordingly, in addition to satisfying minimum Article III requirements, plaintiffs
challenging government action (or inaction) must establish that their injury
falls within the “zone of interests” that the statute aims to protect.335
Although complete elaboration of this proposal would go beyond the scope
of this Article, more robust development of statutory default rules might provide a more coherent set of standing principles, while at the same time preserving ultimate congressional authority to enable broader judicial oversight
of executive enforcement decisions.
332 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42
DUKE L.J. 1141, 1160 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 224, at 167 (examining the constraint of
the “concrete injury” requirement on standing). That is not to say that Congress should be
able to give standing to itself. Legislative standing, even if provided for by statute, raises
distinct concerns because it would force courts to directly referee inter-branch legal disputes, without any intermediation by a personally affected private litigant. See generally
Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 571, 573 (2014) (“Congress has the constitutional power to investigate the
executive and judicially enforce subpoenas but . . . it cannot defend federal statutes in
court.”).
333 This claim draws from a rich line of argument, including, in particular, now Judge
William A. Fletcher’s classic article, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223–24
(1988).
334 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
335 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388
(2014) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
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As the Court held, pre-Lujan, in Linda R.S., it could be that certain areas
of law subject to heavily discretionary, exclusively public enforcement, such
as federal criminal law, protect no one in particular but only the public at
large, thus leaving no particular individual with standing to challenge nonenforcement.336 But to the extent that is true, the fault should lie ultimately
with Congress rather than the Constitution. As is already true with respect to
zone-of-interests analysis, the focus of inquiry should be on whose interests
Congress meant to protect, rather than on whether those interests satisfy
some abstract notion of concreteness.
CONCLUSION
Although cases and commentary often describe nonenforcement as an
executive prerogative, immune to judicial or congressional control, exercises
of executive enforcement discretion are better understood to present a form
of political question—an executive obligation subject to incomplete judicial
enforcement. In the political question doctrine’s terms, one narrow but
important enforcement function, bringing particular civil or criminal
enforcement suits in court, is “textually assigned” to the executive branch
and thus beyond direct judicial control. Broader enforcement questions,
including most administrative nonenforcement and more general nonenforcement practices and policies, frequently involve “judicially unmanageable” questions that courts should leave to political rather than legal
accountability. This framework makes clear that judicial doctrines do not
exhaust executive obligations with respect to law enforcement. But the
framework also highlights contexts, such as review of nonenforcement policies with affirmative elements and judicial approval of DPAs, where courts
can play a broader role without Article II difficulty. Finally, the framework
supports longstanding arguments that standing should be reoriented towards
identifying statutory beneficiaries rather than abstract conceptions of sufficiently concrete injury.
The political question doctrine itself is controversial. Some question the
merits of insulating any important legal or constitutional questions from judicial resolution on the merits,337 while others doubt that denying a judicial
336 I take no position here on whether states have standing, either under current doctrine or my proposal, to challenge immigration nonenforcement policies, as they are
attempting to do in current litigation. As a general matter, courts have taken a very narrow
view of the interests protected by immigration statutes. Compare, e.g., Mendoza v. Perez,
754 F.3d 1002, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[W]orkers displaced by lax visa policies from jobs
they otherwise would hold fall within the class of individuals whom the INA seeks to protect.”), with Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 93 F.3d 897, 902–03 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (doubting that Congress intended “universal litigative champions” for immigration restrictions), and Programmers Guild, Inc. v. Chertoff, 338 F. App’x 239, 244–45 (3d
Cir. 2009) (following Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform). Any asserted injury, furthermore,
should be causally connected to the specific government action being challenged (here
DAPA itself and not the mere presence of undocumented immigrants in the country).
337 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 96–101 (1987).
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remedy is meaningfully different from conferring unfettered discretion.338
The argument presented here sheds light on these debates as well. If the key
criteria for political questions may usefully describe and structure judicial
inquiries with respect to so familiar an executive function as nonenforcement, then the argument presented here may reinforce the value of distinguishing between executive obligation and judicial enforcement more
generally. What is more, elements of the structure I have presented here—a
remedial (rather than substantive) limit on judicial authority, and substantial
congressional responsibility for the problem’s judicial unmanageability—
might be relevant to other political questions as well, particularly war powers.
At the least, the framework underscores that within our system of coequal
branches and separated powers courts cannot enforce every obligation; some
should be left to public officials’ accountability and conscience. But by the
same token, in law enforcement, as in other areas, the political branches
should recognize that the limits of judicial supervision are not necessarily the
limits of the law.

338 The classic statement of this view is Henkin, supra note 86. For a more recent formulation of the argument, see Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now
Clearly Dead: The “Political Question Doctrine” As a Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J.L. & POL. 427, 428
(2014) (“[I]n nearly all cases involving a ‘political question,’ the Court has adjudicated the
case by finding that the branch whose conduct was being challenged acted legally.”).
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